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1. Introduction: Uses, Sources, and Collection of Forecasts
To men who must plan and act——in government, business, even in such
private affairs as personal finance—----economic forecasts are tools for reducing
uncertainty and inputs into the process of making decisions. To persons in
positions of authority, they may serveas a means of communicating
intentions or influencing opinion. To professional economists, they are
important as products of theories, judgments, and estimating procedures,
which can be used intesting the underlying hypotheses, models, and
methods. Forecasts of business conditions can be sampled to examine their
consensus and dispersion at any time and also continuous revisions over time:
this may provide the observer of the economic scene with useful information
about what the prevailing climate of opinion is and how it is changing. By
analyzing the relations between predictions and subsequent realizations, the
accuracy of the former, which interests both makers and users of forecasts,
can be assessed. By analyzing the relations between current predictions and
earlier predictions and actual events, some understanding can be gained of the
genesis of those forecasts that are not based on specific, reproducible
methods, and this is of particular concern to the student of the formation and
economics of expectations.
The recent and current studies of short-term economic forecasting by the
National Bureau of Economic Research, which supply much material for this
Note: I wish to thank Messrs. Mervin A. Daub and James C. Ellert and Mrs. Josephine
Su for their valuable statistical assistance. I am also grateful to Mrs. Ester Moskowitz,
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paper, are directly or indirectly concerned with all of these different uses of
forecasts. The reports by Moore and Shiskin, Zarnowitz, Fels and Hinshaw,
Mincer, Cole, and others, produced in the first phase of this project and
published during 1967_69,1 focus on the accuracy of general economic
forecasts and onseveralrelatedtopics,includingfactors thataffect
forecasting procedures and performance; properties and quality of forecasting
tools and targets (indicator series, anticipatory data, national aggregates of
income and output); and the dependence of forecasts and their errors on
types of economic change, in particular cyclical developments and turning
points. This work is, as usual, in many ways a continuation of previous
efforts: from the early (1929) report of Cox [6], through the NBER
conference volumes of 1951 and 1955 [27], [5], to the subsequent studies
by Christ [21,Okun[201, [211, Stekier [23}, Suits [241. Theil [251, [261,
and others, much has been done to develop and apply methods of evaluating
various types of economic forecasts. But the recent National Bureau studies
have put research in this area on a more comprehensive and systematic basis
by collecting and analyzing a substantial body of data on economic forecasts
of various types. The availability of these relatively rich and authenticated
quantitative materials reflects the great proliferation of forecasting activity in
the last two decades.
The materials analyzed in the early stages of the project consist in large
part of predictions by business economists, who are in fact the source of the
great majority of economic forecasts in the United States. The demand for
forecasts of economic conditions increased greatly in the last two decades,
judging from the expansion of the corresponding output, and business
management clearly had a very large share in that The preference of
business has been for unconditional and, increasingly, for specific and
numerical predictions. Forecasts by company economists are for the most
part unaccompanied by explicit specifications of the methods or models used.
In aiming at the comprehensive economic aggregates, such as gross national
product (GNP) and its major components, they are presumably motivated by
the working hypothesis that forecasts of these macrovariables are needed for
predicting the microvariables of direct interest to a company (notably its own
sales). The microforecasts, however, are generally not available and were not
studied.
'These publications include [181, [29], [11], [15], and [4J (see References at end
of this paper). These are reports of a study of short-term economic forecasting that was
supported by grants to the National Bureau from the Whiripooi Corporation, General
Electric Company, Ford Motor Company Fund, Reim Foundation, and the U.S. Steel
Corporation, as well as by other funds of the National Bureau. A grant of electronic
computer timetothe National Bureau by the International Business Machines
Corporation was used for some of the statistical analysis.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 185
A continuing quarterly survey of general economic forecasts, based on a
new questionnaire designed by the NBER, was initiated in November 1968 by
the American Statistical Association; since then, its results are being regularly
processed and analyzed by the National Bureau.2 In the past year, steps were
also taken to start a systematic collection of quarterly forecasts and related
statistics for several major econometric models of the United States economy.
Inthissecond,current phase of the NBER research on forecasting,
econometric models are a major subject for study, with primary attention
being given to their short-term forecasting qualities and related properties,
such as the ability to simulate cyclical developments in the economy and the
effects of policy changes. Two products of this work are forthcoming. One,
by Evans, Haitovsky, and Treyz [9] ,dealswith the predictive performance of
the quarterly Wharton and OBE models; the other, by Zarnowitz, Boschan,
and Moore [34], with the cyclical and other properties of these models and
the FRB-MIT-PENN modelasrevealed by various nonstochastic and
stochastic simulations.3 Further studies in this area are in progress.
In the next section of this report, I attempt to identify and review the
main lines of investigation pursued in the National Bureau studies of
economic forecasting and related topics. In the third section, some results of
these studies are brougjit up to date and evaluated. In the last section plans
for future research are discussed.
2. Directions of Recent andCurrentResearch
2.1 Measures of the Accuracy andStructureof Forecasts
Whatever services the forecasts are expected to render to the user, they
vary greatly, and are not easily defined by an outside observer; but the
usefulness of most forecasts is surely in the first place a positive function of
their accuracy. We therefore began by working on methods of assessing the
2Mrs. Charlotte Boschan and I share the responsibility for this work. The resultsaxe
reported quarterly in press releases published in each successive issue of The American
Statistician beginning in April 1969. The survey is carried out among members of the
Business and Economic Statistics (B & E) Section of the ASA, with nationwide coverage;
the participants are business, government, and academic economists whose professional
work involves regular forecasting of the course of the economy. Ten major economic
indicators are predicted for each of. the four quarterly periods ahead, the base levels of
the forecasts are specified, and questions are answered regarding the major assumptions
and methods used and the probabilities attached to the expected changes in some key
variables. For a description of the survey, see [32]; for an appraisal of the predictions
for the first three quarters covered, see [33].
3For descriptions of the Wharton-EFU (Economic Forecasting Unit), OBE (Office of
Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce), and FRB-MIT-PENN models, see
[10], [14],and [22],respectively.186 The Business Cycle Today
degreeofpredictiveaccuracyandapplyingthemtothecollected
"judgmental" forecasts ([29] and [161).
Accuracy is evaluated first with the aid of a battery of statistical measures
of the closeness with which predictions approximate realizations. Arithmetic
and absolute averages and standard deviations of forecast errors are employed
as simple descriptive devices. Regressions of actual on predicted values and
the decomposition of mean square errors provide estimates of bias and
inefficiency. The measurement of accuracy in this absolute sense is followed
by comparisons of actual forecast errors with errors resulting from alternative
extrapolations of the time series concerned. There is a progression of these
benchmark extrapolations from the simplest "naive models" to technically
rather sophisticated autoregressive forms; but even the best of them make
little or no use of economic theory and pose relatively few requirements in
terms of data and computational operations. Thus, these comparisons with
the benchmark models show what, if any, is the net contribution of the
forecasts to the information about the future that can be obtained from other
quicker and cheaper methods.
Besidesbeingusefulasyardsticksofpredictiveperformance,
extrapolations can help explain the implicit structure of judgmental forecasts
on the plausible assumption that most of these (and other) forecasts rely, to
some extent, on various types of extrapolation. In [16, sec. III] ,methodsare
developed to decompose forecasts and forecast errors into extrapolative and
other (autonomous) components. Application to a few sets of business
forecasts shows how this approach can be used to evaluate the relative
importance of extrapolations in generating such forecasts, and the effects of
extrapolation error on forecasting error. In [17] ,furtherefforts are made to
infer from the available forecast data, and particularly their estimated
extrapolative components, how forecasters may be revising their expectations
in the light of their past errors. Of the linear models of adaptive behavior
examined, the one that receives most support and attention involves forecast
revisions which are a fraction of the current observed forecast error, the
fraction being smaller for longer-term than for near-term predictions. This
analysis is extended in [8] and applied to the problem of how forecasts of
future spot rates of interest are formed in the market (the working hypothesis
here being that these market forecasts are given by the forward rates implicit
in the term structure).
2.2 The Effects of Data Errors and of the Time Span of Prediction
In [29]several factors are shown to affect strongly the absolute and
relative accuracy of the forecasts assembled there. One is the lack of accurate
information about the conditions prevailing at the time the forecast is made.
The initial level from which the predicted change is measured must itself be
predicted; and although these base values are estimated at a close range, they
often contain significant erors which contribute to the errors of forecast.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 187
This is closely related to the broader subject of the effects of errors in current
and past data on forecasting accuracy. In[4], successive revisions of
provisional GNP estimates are found to reduce the GNP data errors on most
occasions, mainly by reducing errors arising from extrapolations of past
benchmark values. The provisional estimates are themselves partly near-term
predictions, and they have some characteristics frequently observed in "true"
forecasts such as the tendency to underestimate increases and levels of GNP.
The estimates for a year just ended are on the average substantially more
accurate than the forecasts for a year ahead, but they are not much better
than the forecasters' own estimates of the current or base levels (which are
typically made about three to four months earlier). The use of preliminary
rather than revised GNP data appears to account for more than one-third of
the observed average errors of the annual GNP forecasts [3].
Accuracy tends to diminish steadily as the forecast span increases [29].
Business economists'forecastsof GNP and industrial production, for
example, are typically better than various types of extrapolation over periods
from one to three quarters ahead. Forecasts for four quarters or more ahead,
however, are generally not superior to simple extrapolations of the recent
trend. Year-to-year forecasts are on the whole more accurate than even the
more refined autoregressive projections, but they can be viewed as having
mean spans of little more than six months.4 Decomposition of relative mean
square errors, in [16] ,showsthat the contribution to predictive efficiency of
the nonextrapolative (autonomous) component of the forecast typically
declines as the span lengthens. At the same time, trend projections become
potentially more useful, but forecasts fail to take sufficient advantage of
them and consequently deteriorate faster than the best of the extrapolations
as the predictive span is extended beyond a few quarters. However, marginal
errors of multiperiod forecasts show no systematic rise, so average errors
increase less than in proportion to the lengthening of the span. They also
increase much less than the errors in simple naive models (see [291).
Consideration of ingredients of general economic forecasts helps to explain
these findings. In addition to extrapolations of some kind, forecasters use
relations between the series to be predicted and known lagged values or
estimated current values of other variables; various indicators of major
changes in aggregate economic activity and in anticipatory data such as
surveys of consumer and investment intentions and government budget
estimates; and, fmally, their own judgments. Each of these potential sources
of forecast is likely to deteriorate as the span of prediction increases. The
4me annual forecasts are generally made in the late autumn for the calendax year that
is about to begin; if they score well in the first two quarters, their record will be
moderately good for the year as a whole.188 The Business Cycle Today
forecasting relations between time series involve various lags, but typically the
relations weaken as .the lags are increased. Most of the leading business cycle
indicators have relatively short effective forecasting leads beyond which their
usefulness declines (see[18]and [19]). The same appears to apply to
anticipatorydata and probably to informed judgments and estimates
generally
2.3Errors in Predicting Economic Growth
Other studies have suggested that forecasters tend to underestimate
changes in the predicted series.6 This would not be a type of systematic error
that forecasters could or should avoid if it merely resulted from failure to
predict random variations in the actual values. Indeed, forecasts that captured
all but the random component of the change can be viewed as optimal, and
they would necessarily be underestimates in the sense of having a smaller
variance than that of the actual values. (This last property applies more
generally to all unbiased and efficient predictions of change; see [16, p. 18]).
However, underestimation becomes undesirable if it applies to longer cyclical
movements,notjusttoshortirregularvariations;predictionsthat
systematically understate high values and overstate low values of the series are
inefficient (being correlated with their own errors) and can be corrected
(potentially) (see [16] and [29]). Finally, forecasts with a tendency either to
under- or overestimate the actual values of the given series (its "levels")
contain a bias, which is usually regarded as a very objectionable error that
should be eliminated as far as possible. But all this refers to population or
"long-run" characteristics. In the limited samples of comparable predictions
and realizations that are typically available, bias and inefficiency are difficult
to ascertain, let alone measure and project with sufficient confidence; hence
attempts to remove or at least drastically reduce such errors are often
frustrated.
5Most data for business and consumer anticipations represent single-span forecasts or
expectations, but the OBE-SEC quarterly surveys of investment intentions produce two
series of anticipated business expenditures for new plant and equipment: the "first
anticipations" (Aj) reported early each quarter for the next quarter and the "second
anticipations" (A2) reported at the same time for the current quarter. A2 is on the
average substantially more accurate than A1 (see Okun in [28, p. 436] ,withreferences).
Also,inregressions of purchase rates for new automobiles on consumer buying
intentions and attitudes (Bureau of the Census and University of Michigan Survey
Research Center data) better results are obtained in most cases with a six-month lag of
purchases than with nine- or twelve-month lags (see Table 5-2 and text in [13]).
6See Franco Modigliani and Owen H. Sauerlander in [5,pp. 288—289] and H. Theil
in [25, Chap. Ill—VI], among others.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 189
Most forecasts examined do underestimate on the average the growth of
the economy as measured by GNP. About two-thirds of the annual increases
in GNPduringthe period 1952—63 were underpredicted; and the same
applies to the concurrent changes in personal consumption expenditures, a
still more smoothly growing aggregate which experienced no year-to-year
decreases. The declines in GNPwereless frequently underestimated. Changes
in series that fluctuated more and grew less vigorously (e.g., gross private
domestic investment in 1952—63) have been overestimated about as often as
they have been underestimated. The same applies to decreases in all the major
GNPexpenditurecomponents taken together; but these were justas
frequently missed (though the proportion of these turning-point errors varies
greatly among forecasts from different sources). As for increases, in this set of
predictions they were underestimated nearly half the time and overestimated
more than one-third of the time, while turning-point errors accounted for the
remaining one-sixth of the observations [29, pp. 45—51].
These findings suggest that the observed "underestimation of changes"
reflectsprincipallya conservative prediction of growth rates in series
dominated by upward trends. As this implies, the levels of such series also are
generally underpredicted [16, p. 19].
2.4 Predicting Cyclical Movements and Turning Points
Predictive errors appear to be affected by the cyclical characteristics of the
forecast period [29, pp. 27—30].Thus,the underestimation of the increases
in GNPistypically largest for the beginning of a recovery from a business
recession, when the growth rates are particularly high. Later in the expansion,
the increases are usually smaller, at least in relative terms, and the amount of
underestimationison the whole much less(andthesameapplies,
consequently, to the associatedtarget levels of the forecasts). Indeed,
overestimation prevailedin one period of retardation (1962) and was
frequent in another (1967). In contractions, the predicted levels are often too
high, sometimes because the decline turned out to be larger than expected
but mainly because the downturn was missed.
Annual forecasts of GNPhadsome success in predicting both the
frequency and the timing of the turning points [29, pp. 5 1—59; 19, pp.
3—5]Theyare certainly superior in this respect to extrapolations, which
are by and large incapable of signalizing the business cycle turns and are
instead apt either to "smooth" them out of existence or to reproduce them
with lags. It is true that forecasts can and occasionally do predict turns which
of the detailed information underlying the discussion in this and the three
following paragraphs has not yet been published; it is contained in Victor Zarnowitz,
"The Record of Turning Point Forecasts of GNP and Other Major Aggregates," NBER
(draft manuscript).190 The Business Cycle Today
then fail to occur, while trend projections avoid giving such "false warnings";
but the latter errors are infrequent and this disadvantage of forecasts is
outweighed by their advantage of missing fewer actual turning points. A naive
assumption that next year will always produce a turning point would avoid all
errors of missed turns, but it would of course be a very poor one for
predicting comprehensive aggregates such as GNP in an economy that tends
to grow most of the time; the forecasts are far better than this benchmark
model in that they make fewer errors of the false-signal type. They are also
much better than the almost equally naive assumption that GNPisa series of
random numbers and also better than the somewhat less naive model that
would treat the annual change in GNP as random [19, p. 4].
However, these comparisons do not imply that the forecasters were able to
predict the turns in the months ahead; they indicate only an ability to
recognize the turns with relative promptness. Consider the forecasts for 1954
made in November or December of 1953: They showed 1954 as lower than
1953 in terms of GNP, i.e., 1953 to be a peak year. But by this time the
midyear at which the turning point in annual data is conventionally dated was
long over. Actually, the peak in the business cycle occurred in or near July
1953, and late in the year (at the height of the "forecasting season") the
declinewas widely recognized, though notnecessarilyasacyclical
contraction or recession.8 In 1957 the peak again occurred shortly after
midyear and forecasts made in late autumn or early winter had only to
recognize a contraction then in process; in 1960, the peak probably came still
earlier (the NBER reference month is May), but the recognition process was
generally slower, reflecting the disturbing effects of the 1959 steel strike and
the shallowness of the contraction. In each of these three episodes, the task
of predicting annual changes was also made easier by the widespread
expectation (which proved largely correct) that the contraction would be
short and mild. Furthermore, the timing of the troughs was early enough for
the forecasts made late in 1954, 1958, and 1961 to benefit from many
indications that each of the respective contractions had already ended or was
about to.
Forecasts made near the middle of the year for the next calendar year
account only for one-tenth of all annual GNP predictions collected in [29].
Their record is a great deal worse than that of the end-of-year forecasts and
not much better than guesswork as far as turning-point errors are concerned
[19].
Forecasts made two or four times in a year for sequences of four to six
quarters ahead are more relevant for an appraisal of turning-point errors. The
8See Rendigs Fels, "The Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts," in [11, Part I, p.
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reason is that there are more turns in quarterly than in annual series, and they
can be dated with greater precision. There are relatively few directional errors
associated with increases, but many associated with decreases (that is, missed
peaks). Of 194 predicted quarter-to-quarter rises in GNP, 155, or nearly 80
per cent, coincided with actual rises; of 19 predicted declines, only 4, or 21
per cent, did so.9 As this shows, forecasters know very well that increases
prevail heavily among the quarterly changes of GNP, and they make increases
similarly dominant in their predictions (in fact, somewhat more so). What the
forecasters evidently do not know is how to anticipate correctly when the
declines are coming. Predictions for sequences of two semiannual periods
ahead (from different sources) have a slightly better record, but they too are
consistent with the general conclusion that there islittle evidence of
forecasters' ability to detect the major cyclical reversals in the economy well
in advance of the event.
Statements about the business outlook inthe leading business and
financial publications show a pattern in the neighborhood of business cycle
peaks and troughs. The analysts "become increasingly aware of first the
possibility, then the probability, and finally the certainty of a turning point"
[11 ,PartI, p. 47}. In the three months preceding the event, expectations of a
turn become slowly but clearly stronger and more definite, and the process of
increasing recognition continues for several months after the actual turn (as
dated ex post in the NBER reference cycle chronology). The recognition of
the four business cycle troughs in the period 1948—6 1 has been on the whole
faster than the recognition of the four peaks. Evidently, the analysts, like the
majority of forecasters, were basically optimistic about the growth prospects
of the economy and the short-lived nature of the contractions. Given this
prevalent attitude and the historical course of events, the downturns proved
to be more difficult to predict and recognize than the upturns.
The system of scoring reports on the economic outlook developed in [11,
Part I] was applied in a companion study to the appropriate statements in the
minutes of the regular meetings of the Federal Reserve Board's Open Market
Committee (FOMC) in 1948—60.'° The results are of major interest in view
of the importance of the FOMC in determining the nation's monetary policy.
They indicate that the Committee was a little more successful than the
9An alternative way of describing this property of the quarterly forecasts is this: of
43 actual declines in GNP, 39 or nearly 91 per cent were missed. It may also be noted
that most of the predicted declines relate to the first two quarters ahead; beyond that,
for the third to sixth quarters ahead, very few declines were anticipated and none at the
right times.
10C. Elton Hinshaw, "The Recognition Pattern of the Federal Open Market
Committee," in [11, Part Ill192 The Business Cycle Today
averageof the published business outlook reports in recognizing and
confirming (not in predicting ahead of the event) the cyclical peaks and
troughs of the economy. The FOMC definitely avoided false signals more
successfully than did the business analysts.
Beforethedate of a business cycle peak or trough, the estimated
probability of the occurrence of a turning point was typically below 50 (on a
oto100 scoring scale) for both the business analysts and the FOMC [11,
Parts I and II]. Only one or two months aftertheturn would the odds begin
to favor slightly the affirmation of a cyclical reversal over its negation. The
odds would then reach 3 to 1 (probability of 75) about three or four months
after the turn and odds of 9 to 1 (probability of 90) about five or six months
after.This recordisin most cases somewhat worse than that of the
quantitative business forecasts[11, Part 1, pp. 45—46]. It confirms the
general lack of demonstrated ability to predict major turning points in
aggregate economic activity ahead of the event.
2.5Forecastsof the Major Expenditure Components of GNP
Forecasts of total GNP are often substantially better, in the sense of
having smaller percentage change errors, than the forecasts of most major
GNP expenditure components from the same source [291.Theover-all
predictionsapparentlybenefit frompartialcancellationof errorsin
predictions of the components. While thisis definitely preferable to the
opposite case of positively correlated and mutually reinforcing errors, any
gross inaccuracies in the components must of course be seen as detracting
from the quality of the forecaster's product, even if these errors happen to be
largely compensating. However, there are some systematic factors that are
likely to confer a relative advantage on the GNP forecasts. Certain methods of
forecasting, such as the use of business cycle indicators or monetary variables,
are concerned directly with measures of aggregate economic activity rather
than with any component expenditures or sectors of the economy, and hence
may yield betterforecastsfortotal GNP. Moreover, there are strong
equilibrating or shock-absorbing forces at work in the economy, which
effectively localize many disturbances that impinge upon the different
processes or sectors. As a consequence, GNP isa rather smooth series
dominated by a pronounced growth tendency, and it is therefore easier to
predict than most of its components, which are much more volatile."
rule has important exceptions, however: the massive aggregate of personal
consumption expenditures, which accounts presently for over 60 per cent of GNP,
follows a smoother course than total GNP, owing to the stability of personal outlays on
nondurable goods and services and despite the volatility of spending on automobiles and
other durables. The total of state and local governments' purchases of goods and services
also shows fewer and smaller relative deviations from trend than does GNP.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 193
There is strong evidence that the more volatile a series, the more difficult
is the prediction of its relative changes and the greater the probable forecast
error [29, Chap. 4] .Thus,only total and nondurables consumption and state
and local expenditures are predicted about as well as, or better than, total
GNP, according to the business forecasts for 1953—63 (see footnote 11). The
errors in predicting percentage changes in personal consumption are far
smaller than those in forecasts of gross private domestic investment, whereas
the errors for total government spending are intermediate: larger than those
in consumption but much smaller than those in investment. Within aggregate
consumption, the errors for durable goods exceed greatly those for either the
nondurablesorservices.Withinaggregateinvestment,therecordfor
producers' durable equipment turns out to be worse than that for total new
construction.1 2
Althoughthe errors of consumption forecasts are smaller than those for
the other major GNP components when measured in deviations of percentage
changes, they are large relative to the errors of appropriate extrapolations.
The consumption aggregates (except for durable goods) are smoothly growing
series that could have been predicted very well by simple trend projections;
and, indeed, the average errors of the latter have often been smaller than
those of recorded consumption forecasts. It would seem, then, that there is
much scope for potential improvement in these forecasts, through better
utilization of the historical content of the series.'
Improvement appears to be much more difficult to come by, but is
probably even more necessary, in forecasts of components of investment,
particularly residential structures, changes in inventories, and net exports.
Even though these series have relatively weak trends and strong cyclical and
irregular movements, and hence cannot be very effectively extrapolated by
any simple means, their forecasts have on the whole proved to be either just
slightly better or worse than mere extrapolations of last levels or average
'2Expenditures on producers' durables have been less stable than those on structures
in the period here covered. Expenditures on housing, however, have fluctuated widely
and behaved quite differently from other major expenditure categories, reflecting the
countercyclical effects of financial factors (mortgage credit was scarce in several periods
of advanced expansion and relatively abundant in some periods of late contraction and
recovery).
13Themore volatile the series to be predicted, the less can the forecast in general gain
from extrapolation. It is quite reasonable that forecasters should make greater use of
extrapolation where this promises to be more efficient. Apparently, such distinctions are
in fact made, for we observe that, e.g., forecasts of plant and equipment outlays have
relatively smaller extrapolative components than forecasts of consumption [16, pp.
30—31]. However, the latter forecasts are still deficient in their use of the extrapolative
potential of the consumption series.194 The Business Cycle Today
changes. The predictions of net inventory change are particularly important
for an appraisal of the business outlook intimes of mild economic
fluctuations, during which the "inventory cycle" is widely believed to play a
major role; but these predictions are also particularly unsatisfactory. 14
Aggregationof short-term expectations of business concerns about their
expenditures on plant and equipment results in better predictions of the total
of such capital outlays than are available from the independently made global
forecasts of business fixed investment. This can be inferred from the
markedly lower accuracy of the annual investment forecasts collected in [29]
that were made before the McGraw-Hill Survey of Investment Intentions
compared to those made after it. Also, the OBE-SEC investment anticipations
series show not only very high simple correlations with actual plant and
equipment expenditures but also high partialcorrelations, holding the
investment forecasts constant. In contrast, the investment forecasts add very
little or nothing to the statistical explanation of the variance of actual
expenditures after allowing for the high correlation of expenditures with
anticipations: the partial correlations here are small and as often negative as
positive. This applies to quarterly as well as annual predictions [30, pp.
30—33].
2.6 Forecasts of Production and the Price Level
Among variables other than GNP an.d its major components, the FRB
index of industrial production representsafavorite target of business
economists' forecasts. It is generally predicted with a degree of accuracy
similar to that of the GNP forecasts from the same sources, at least for the
annual and shorter forecasts: comparisons in terms of index numbers on a
commonbasesomewhatfavorGNP;comparisonswith benchmark
extrapolations in most cases favor industrial production [291. For longer
spans, predictions of the FRB index often come out better than those of
GNP, according to the yardstick of simple trend projections. Monthly data
provide more current information than quarterly data, which gives an
advantage to the industrial production forecasts. The latter suffer less from
the underestimation-of-growth bias than the GNP forecasts do, but they are
more adversely affected by errors. In terms of correlation of
actual with predicted changes, the forecasts of both GNP and industrial
production are defmitely superior to all examined types of extrapolation,
14For example, in business predictions for 1953—63, the absolute average error of
forecasts (in current dollars) was greater for net inventory change than for total
government expenditures and the major components of fixed investment, even though
the average magnitude of the inventory change is very small compared with the typical
levels of these other variables [29, pp. 39—40].Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 195
including the relatively accurate trend projections and autoregressive models.
This advantage of greater efficiency appears to be widespread, and it is by and
large not offset by the disadvantage of greater bias that the forecasts often
have relative to the best of the benchmark extrapolations [29, Chap. 6].The
advantage can be traced to the contribution of the autonomous components
of the forecasts [16, sec. II].
Forecasts of general price movements, although still much less numerous
thanthoseof GNPandrelated variables, attract increasing attention in these
times of strong inflationary tendencies. Forecasts of the Consumer Price
Index in recent years (mainly 1957—67, though some sets go back to 1953
and before) have on the average been more accurate than the naive model
predictions. Some but not all of them were also better than simple trend
(average historical change) extrapolations. Forecasts of the Wholesale Price
Index were on the whole considerably weaker, but this is partly due to the
extraordinary stability of this index in the years 1958—64 (which favored the
naive"same-level" model). Both the CPI and the WPI forecasts show
generally small average absolute errors, relative to the levels of the indexes
and to the errors of forecasts of other comprehensive series such as GNP; but
the changes in the indexes were also relatively small and less than their
counterpartsfortheseothervariables.Forecastershavetendedto
underestimate the large changes and to overestimate the small changes in the
price indexes, which suggests a certain inertia of expectations; there is more
uniformity and predictability in the predicted than in the actual price-level
behavior. However, here too, there are definite positive correlations between
the forecast and the realized changes, and mechanical extrapolations of past
price levels or changes could not have done as well in this respect [311.
The effects of the price errors on the GNPforecastsare not always
adverse. For several forecast sets, these errors were negatively correlated with
the errors of the implicit quantity component of GNP.'As a consequence
of partial offsets between the errors of the quantity and price components,
forecasts of GNPincurrent dollars have been on the average more accurate
than the implicit forecasts of GNP in constant dollars for most of the private
sources of the CPI and WPI predictions assembled in [31].
15Sincethere axe no predictions of the GNP price deflator from these sources, a
weighted combination of CPI and WPIforecastshad to be used asa rough
approximation. The resulting composite price-level forecasts were applied to the GNP
forecasts from the same source to obtain the implicit predictions of GNP in constant
dollars. Expressing all figures as forecasts of percentage changes, additive quantity and
price component's were then computed. As an outcome of this decomposition, three
series of predictions are available for each of the forecast sets covered, relating to GNP in
constant dollars, the composite price level, and GNP in current dollars.196 The Business Cycle Today
Materials on business forecasts of different variables suggest that turning
points in lagging indicators such as plant and equipment expenditures and
consumer prices are on the whole more accurately predicted than turning
points in leading or coincident indicators such as inventory change and
wholesale prices. Forecasts of the laggers benefit from observation of related
series that move earlier in the course of the business cycle [19, p. 5].
2.7 Econometric Model Forecasts and Simulations
Moore [19, pp. 12—14] presents an analysis of predictions of annual
percentage changes in GNP in constant dollars, based on an econometric
model that grew out of the early work by Lawrence Klein and Arthur
Goldberger and was developed by Daniel Suits[24]. The forecasts are
prepared by the Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics, and they are
usuallypresentedinthe November preceding thetarget yearatthe
Conference on the Economic Outlook, both at the University of Michigan.'6
Sixteen forecasts, for 1953—68, are evaluated in [19]. Their mean absolute
error is about 1 .5 percentage points, less than half of the corresponding mean
of actual changes (3.8 percentage points). The results for 1953—63 are almost
identical, and they resemble closely those obtained for one of the judgmental
forecast sets in [29], which also refers to changes in real GNP during the
same period.1
7Thesecomparisons suggest that, in predicting changes in
GNP excludingtheprice movements, forecasts with this econometric
model "appear to stand up comparatively well" [19, p. 14]. Similarly,
Cunnyngham's analysis of GNP predictions in current and constant dollars led
to the conclusion that these forecasts "have been about as accurate as the
better business forecasts" [7, p. 60].
16The predicted percentage changes used in [19] were computed from published
reports of the Michigan Conference and data supplied by the Research Seminar. The
forecasts were not produced by a single model, but rather by a whole family of models
plus judgments about not only the inputs of exogenous variables but also various
adjustments of the constants in some of the equations (assumptions of nonzero
residuals). The models themselves were modified (mostly elaborated) almost from year
to year. Sometimes alternative forecasts for a given year were made, based upon
different data or policy assumptions; see[19, Table 5, p.13]for the numerical
identification of such forecasts and the selections made.
17The other forecasts in that collection (also covering the years 1953—63) are not
directly comparable because they refer to GNP in current dollars and are therefore
affected by errors in predicting the price levels. The mean absolute errors of forecasts of
annual rates of change in current-dollar GNP varied from 1.4 to 3.0 and averaged 2.0
percentage points for the eight sets concerned (only one of these sets, however, had a
mean error of more than 2.3 per cent). The mean of the coefficients of correlation
between the predicted and actual percentage changes in GNP is 0.78 for this sample; the
correlation for the Suits model is 0.72.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 197
However, itis very important to keep in mind that these are ex ante
predictionsthat involve judgmental forecast of the exogenous inputs,
recurrent revisions of the model, and frequent adjustments of the constant
terms ("fine tuning")——all of these decisions being subject to modifications
in the light of the preliminary and other information available to the
econometric forecaster. Such results, therefore, tell us something about how
well the latter forecasts rather than about how well the econometric model
forecasts. To answer questions about the forecasting quality of both the
models and the econometrician's judgments, and about how these elements
interact, it is necessary to analyze not only the ex ante but also the ex post
forecasts (which use the actual historical values for the exogeneous inputs)
and to take into account the adjustments of the constant terms.
A systematic analysis of this kind was made recently for the quarterly
Wharton-EFU and OBE models in19]. Its principal findings are very
revealing. The true ex ante forecasts are superior to the ex post forecasts with
the same constant-term adjustments and lagged values of the endogenous
variables. Thus, surprisingly, the forecasts made with the model-builders'
estimates for the exogenous variables are here better (mostly by substantial
margins) than the forecasts with the correct values of these variables. The true
ex ante forecasts (with subjective adjustments of constant terms) are
generally much better than forecasts that use the same estimated exogenous
inputs but either without adjustments or with only mechanical adjustments
of constant terms. The 'ex ante" forecasts in the latter category tend to be
more accurate than the ex post forecasts of the OBE model with the same
mechanical adjustments or with none, but this result is reversed for the
Wharton model.'8
It is clear that the intercept adjustments must have often improved these
forecasts considerably, which speaks well for the econometrician's judgment
qua forecaster. But the poor showing of the ex post forecasts indicates that
"econometric models cannot generate good forecasts if they are used only in
a mechanical fashion" [9, p. 160]. Indeed, such forecasts are in a great many
cases worse than the simplest naive models of the "same change" or even of
the "no change" variety, when made over the shortest spans (of one or two
quarters) and without any adjustments. The accuracy of the forecasts relative
to the naive models improves with the lengthening of the span to three to six
quarters, which reflects the fact that the forecast errors (1) have relatively
smallsystematic components, and (2) are mainly due to "imperfect
'8The period covered by the Wharton model forecasts is I-1965—IV-1968; that
covered by the OBE model forecasts is H-1967—IV-1968. The forecasts are quarterly,
and each consists of a sequence of predictions for either one to six quarters ahead
(Wharton) or for one to four quarters ahead (OBE).198 The Business Cycle Today
covariation" [25, pp.35—371, onecan also say that the forecasts track the
longer movements better than the shortest changes over the next quarters.
However, since the errors of the ex post predictions are significantly large for
the longer spans, and the naive models represent quite weak standards for
such forecasts, none of these results can be viewed as really satisfactory.
Three different possible reasons are suggested in [9] for the finding that
ex ante forecasts are better than ex post ones: (a) the original (subjective)
adjustments succeeded in offsetting "bad guesses" about the exogenous
inputs; (b) the actual data are at fault; and (c) errors in forecasts of
exogenous variables tend to cancel the misspecification errors in the models.
The authors dismiss (a) on the ground that, in almost half the cases, the ex
ante forecasts retain their superiority even when no adjustments or the same
mechanical adjustments are used in these and the corresponding ex post
forecasts. They treat (b) rather more seriously, though viewing only the
figures for government expenditures as likely to be distorted in reporting.1 9
Finally,(c)isdiscussedintheformoftheoffsettingeffectsof
underestimationof government spending and overstatementoffiscal
multipliers.
Of these factors, (c) is most disturbing and (b) is not damaging at all as far
as the predictive quality of a model is concerned. My own conjecture is that
the role of (b) is likely to prove rather limited and that of (c) principal, while
(a) could well be considerably more important than implied by its treatment
in[9] .Butcertainly this whole subject is exceedingly interesting, and it
deserves much further investigation.
Sample-period simulations of the Wharton model for 1-1953—I V.1964 and
of the OBE model for III-1955--IV-1966 are also presented and discussed in
[9]. These are calculated for six quarters ahead from each starting date, that
is, from each consecutive quarter in the sample period.20 They use actual
datafortheinitialconditionsandtheexogenousvariablesbut
model-generated lagged values of endogenous variables after the starting date
'9The reason is that these expenditures and, in particular, defense spending may be
entered in the national income accounts as inventory investment while the goods are
being produced and as government purchases only when they are ready for delivery and
paid for [9, pp. 138—139].
20For the Whaiton-EFU model, the sample period actually starts in 1948, but the
earlier years were excluded from these simulations because of the difficulties with the
solution program encountered for some of the six-quarter intervals during the Korean
War years. Toward the end of the period covered, in 1963—64, the intervals were
gradually reduced to 5,4, ...,1quarters so that they would not reach beyond the
sample period. For the OBE model, however, this was not done: the simulations do not
stop in IV-1966 but continue for six quarters regardless of the originating date. This is
said to be unlikely to affect the main conclusions more than slightly [9, pp. 34-35, 721.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 199
over each simulation period. Their average errors increase steadily as the
prediction span lengthens from one to six quarters, but they tend strongly to
decline with the span when taken relative to the average errors of the naive
model of last-known level projections. For the one-quarter span, the Wharton
simulations are not much better than the extrapolations with this naive
model. The simulations of the OBE model tend to have smaller errors than
the simulations of the Wharton-EFU model for the shortest spans, but the
differences narrow and become minor for the longest spans.
The results for the sample-period simulations are generally very different
from those for the ex post forecasts beyond the sample period. The latter
have much larger errors (which for the shortest spans are often greater than
the naive-model errors, as noted before). Also, the constant-term adjustments,
which are essential for obtaining reasonable ex post predictions in the
forecast period, have littleeffect on the accuracy of the sample-period
simulations.
Different types of simulations are examined in [34]nonstochastic model
solutions for the entire sample period and for six-quarter intervals around
business cycle turns, and stochastic simulations for long (hundred-quarter)
spans starting at the end of the sample period and extending into the future.
The main concern in compiling this study is with the dynamic properties of
the models (Wharton, OBE, and FRB-MIT-PENN) and theirrelation to the
observed cyclical characteristics of the U.S. economy. This lies largely outside
the of the subject of forecasting and is treated in a separate
paper.2' Alowever, it should be stated here that the analysis in [34],likethat
in [9], indicates that the models, even though concerned largely with short
movements over a few quarters, do not track such movements very well
(judging, in [34], from the record of six-quarter simulations in the vicinity of
business cycle peaks and troughs).
2.8 Standards of Predictive Performance
Even the least "naive" of the extrapolative models utilize only the past
history (and usually only recent history) of the forecast series; they leave out
much information of potential predictive value and should not represent very
demanding standards for the short-term aggregate forecasts. Sets of past
predictions that have proved superior to the benchmark extrapolations
themselves provide a higher and more realistic standard. However, the future
period may be either more or less difficult to forecast than the past, and it
should be desirable to improve upon, not just match, the historical record.
2'SeeVictorZarnowitz,"Econometric Model Simulations andtheCyclical
Characteristics of the U.S. Economy," another paper prepared for this colloquium.200 The Business Cycle Today
Moreover, comparisons with what happened may over- or undervalue
conditional forecasts, depending on the degree to which the conditions have
or have not been met. For these stated reasons, a different standard is
proposed and experimentally applied in [19, sec. IV]. A composite index of
indicators that have generally led at business cycle peaks and troughs appears
to anticipate GNP by six months: percentage changes between fiscal-year
averages of that index are well correlated with percentage changes between
the subsequent calendar-year values of GNP. This relation would yield
predictions that are mechanically quite accurate but also late and of short
range; to get a benchmark model that would match actual forecasts made,
say, in October-November, the percentage changes in the index are calculated
from the preceding fiscal-year average to the third quarter of the year
preceding the calendar year being forecast.
The method yields the following mean absolute errors of relative change in
GNP (in percentage points):1.8 for 1953—63, 0.7 for 1962—67. The
corresponding error figures are higher for both an average of eight sets of
business forecasts from [29] (2.0 for 1953—63) and the forecasts prepared
by the Council of Economic Advisers and published each year, beginning with
January 1962, in the Economic Report of the President (1.3 for 1962—67).
According to analogous measures for GNP in constant dollars, forecasts with
indicators were slightly less accurate than forecasts with Suits' econometric
model in 19 53—67 and slightly more accurate than Suits' and the Economic
Report forecasts in 1962_67.22
Benchmark forecasts with leading aresimilarto ex post
forecasts with econometric models, and particularly to predictions of GNP
made from reduced forms of larger systems, where the coefficients represent
weights applied to the predetermined variables so as to measure the net direct
or indirect effects of these variables on GNP. Still better, they are analogous
to forecasts from single equations which include only known exogenous
variables as predictors. They share the general advantages and disadvantages
22The mean absolute errors (in percentage points) are: Indicators: 1.6 for 1953—67,
0.9 for 1962—67; Suits' model: 1.5 for 1953—67, 1.1 for 1962—67;EconomicReporr:
1.1for 1962—67. It should be noted that the forecasts of the indicator model for
1962—67 are based on regression equations fitted to data for the prior period, 1949—6 1.
The forecasts for 1953—63, however, benefit from being based on regression equations
fitted to concurrent data (for 1952—6 7).Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 201
of such predictive equations the larger systems.2 3Their specific
source of strength is the selection of variables with strong anticipatory
elements; but, let us recall, the leading indicators were chosen, not with
regard to their correlation with subsequent GNPmovements,but mainly for
the consistency of their timing in the business cycle. The theoretical rationale
for including some of the indicators in this particular synthetic form of
relationship seems weak, and problems of various kinds arise at this point,
notably with respect to differences in the aggregation levels, the timing and
area of impact, the distribution of the lags involved, etc.; but it is not at all
clear what effects these factors have on the proposed method and what can
be done to reduce any difficulties they may cause.24
The single-equation and reduced-form approaches to forecasting have, of
course, a great many different applications. The relative effectiveness of the
23Large models can accomodate more predictors, which is an advantage if the latter
are properly selected and related to each other; but the chances of misspecification and
propagation of errors are by the same token large, too. Advances in technical ability to
handle such models have accelerated enormously with the progress in computer
hardware and software,outstripping the growth in both the required theoretical
knowledge and the availability of proper data. Smaller models suffer correspondingly Less
from such discrepancies, being simpler, more easily surveyed, and less demanding of the
knowledge of economic relationships and the data needed to estimate them; but they
may not be comprehensive enough to do the job well. Single-equation models represent
an extreme class in this ranking by size and simplicity and are strictly applicable only to
one-way cause-and-effect relationships, not to mutual dependencies. For ex ante
predictions,they must employ known lagged values or outside forecasts of the
independent (exogenous) variables; otherwise they can provide only ex post predictions
conditional on. the knowledge of the exogenous inputs.
is possible to establish by experimentation what is the best simple lag in the
relation between the changes in the composite of the indicators and the subsequent
changes in GNP (for some work along these lines, see [19, pp. 16—171), and this could
be extended to distributed lags. But what is optimal in the sample period need not be so
in the forecast period, and the stability of the lag may be especially problematic here
because we are dealing with composites of series with different timing properties.
It may also be instructive to experiment with indexes that differ in the number and
identity of the indicators included (again, some results on this are reported in [19]), and
likewise with different dependent variables (for example, with employment or industrial
production instead of GNP). En short, the procedure is quite flexible and it is easily kept
up to date, too. But these advantages derive from its basically mechanical nature. It is
because of the latter that the method is treated as another benchmark model, though
one that may not be easy to beat. This implies the expectation that, over time, skilled
judgmental use of the indicators should yield better forecasts. (Analogously, judgmental
adjustments are viewed in [9] as necessary means for obtaining good-quality forecasts
from econometric models.)202 The Business Cycle Today
leadingindicatorsmodelclearlysuggestsasimplebutimportant
generalization: that in this comprehensive class of applied economic forecasts
the use of predictors with early timing ("leading" series, "anticipations" data)
has a comparatively high probability of success. Such predictors should
therefore be in strong demand, and one might expect to see much effort
spentonincreasingtheirlimitedsupplybydatacompilation,
experimentation, and testing. The leading indicators and the anticipations
data, although for the most part a by-product of more basic research, have
indeed long been a subject of much scientific interest in their own right, in
recent years primarily at the National Bureau and at the IFO-Institute in
Munich; and there is little doubt that practicing forecasters use such materials
widely. But such data are still not fully and systematically incorporated in
formal econometric models, even where forecasting of short-term movements
of the economy is a major objective. One probable reason for this is that their
use imposes limitations upon the model. When an aggregate anticipations
variable is included, which is based on microdata obtained from surveys of
the relevant decision-making units, it is difficult to extrapolate the model
successfully beyond the time span covered by the survey because the
anticipations themselves cannot be well predicted. A similar problem exists
for the leading indicators.25 Nevertheless, there is surely both need and scope
for making more and better use of such data in forecasting with econometric
models (and indeed in short-term economic forecasting generally).26
3. Forecasts of the U.S. Economy: A Review of the Updated Record
In this section that follows, several standards of predictive performance are
applied to updated materials on forecasts of various types, from "purely"
judgmental to those made by or with econometric models, including
comparisons between forecasts from the same sources for different periods;
between forecasts by different persons and methods made for the same
25At least some of these early-moving series make much better tools than targets of
forecasts. Thus, as shown indetail in Victor Zarnowitz, Orders, Production, and
Investment—A Cyclical and Structural Analysis (New York, NBER, forthcoming), new
orders precede output and shipments in manufacturing industries in which production to
order is important, and they predict these activities as well as possible. However, such
orders contain a large element of "autonomous" expectations and are themselves poorly
predicted. (This is shown, in particular, by microdata on business forecasts of new orders
for nonelectrical machinery in Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Capital Goods
Review, December 1965.) In fact, it is where new orders cannot be predicted sufficiently
well at acceptable costs that production will be largely "to order"; where they can be so
predicted and supplying them appears profitable, production will be "to stock."
26Further remarks on this point are made in section 4 of this paper.p
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periods; between ex ante and ex post forecasts for some econometric models;
and between forecasts and benchmark predictions or extrapolations.
3.1PrivateJudgmental Forecasts of GNP, 1953—69
The record of business and other private judgmental forecasts presented in
[29] ends in 1963. Since then some of these forecasts were discontinued or
excluded, while a few new sets were added to our collection. The amounts of
continuous data from the same sources are now sufficient for compiling a
record of forecasts through 1969 and for attempting to answer the question:
How does the forecasters' performance in the most recent years (1964—69)
compare with their performance in the earlier postwar period (1953—1963 or
parts thereof)?
Table 1 shows some summary measures of accuracy for eight different sets
of annual forecasts of GNP relating to the years 1953—69. The sources are: a
group of economists from various industries, government, and academic
institutions; a graduate faculty group; the economic staffs of three large
businessfirmsininsurance,banking, and manufacturing;abusiness
publication; an individual university researcher; and a business consulting
service. Five of the sets were included in [29], three (K, L, and M) were not.
For the two groups (A and M), which are relatively small, averages of
separate forecasts made by the members are used, and it should be noted that
such averages tend to be more accurate over time than most of the forecasts
by the individual participants in the given group because of compensating
errors among the member forecasters [29, pp. 123—126]. Furthermore,
comparability of the different forecasts sets is impaired by differences in the
periods covered and in the dates of issue (late forecasts can take advantage of
recent information not available for earlier forecasts). However, it is not the
question of who the best forecasters are that concerns us here but rather the
over-all accuracy and some other interesting properties of the forecasters'
products.
Since the initial level from which a change is predicted is itself as a rule
unknown and must be estimated, the error in forecasting the change typically
differs from the error in forecasting the future level, the difference being
equal to the error in the estimated current position or "base" of the forecast.
This base estimate should always be reported by a forecaster but only too
often it is not; however, in recent forecasts this deficiency seems to be much
less frequent, perhaps because the need to remove it, stressed in the literature
reviewed in this paper, is being increasingly recognized.2
27Where the base forecasts aie not reported, they must be imputed to make possible
an analysis of the forecasts of change. Such imputations were made for this study by
extrapolative methods selected so as to approximate as closely as possible any base
estimates for other periods made by the given source (clues of this sort are often
available; where they are not, methods approximating the results for other, similar
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For the GNP forecasts, base errors all have, on the average, negative signs,
as do the errors of change; accordingly, the mean errors of level, which equal
the algebraic sums of the corresponding mean errors of base and of change,
are also all negative and, when signs are disregarded, the errors of level are
largest of the three (Table 1, columns 1—3). The errors are computed by
substracting the actual from the predicted values; thus, given the upward
trend in GNP, the negative signs of the mean errors indicate the forecasters'
tendency to underestimate the increases and hence also the target levels of
this variable. The minus signs of the base errors also are related to this
tendency, which apparently prevailed for the preliminary official estimates of
GNP as well.2 8
Interms of absolute averages, the level errors are in each case larger than
the change errors, (the weighted means for all sets are $10.5 billion and $8.5
billion, respectively) and the base errors are the smallest (columns 4—6). The
latter result accords with expectation, since the present or the recent past
should be better known than the future. However, the base errors are
certainly significant, amounting on the average to more than one-third of the
corresponding level errors.
Comparisons of the forecasts (P) with benchmark extrapolations (JV) were
made in terms of the level errors only, by calculating the ratios of the root
mean square errors (Mp/MN). These measures involve squaring the individual
forecast errors, so that greater weight is attached to large than to small
deviations of predictions from actual values.29 Three extrapolative models
are used: Ni, which projects forward the current level of the given variable
(here, the base-year value of GNP); N2, which projects the last change; and
N2*, which projects an average historical change.3° The ratios are labeled R
and bear the subscript of the model used in computing the denominator, e.g.,
R1 =Mp/MN1.
28See section 2.2 above on the effects of data errors on forecasting errors, with
references to [3] and [41.
29SeeTable 1, footnote b, on the definitions of the root mean square error of
forecast Mp, and the other averages used: mean error (ME) and mean absolute error
(MAE). Except in the trivial case where all, errors are equal, Mp >MAE > ME (compare
the corresponding measures for the level errors in columns 3, 6, and 7 of Table 1).
30The assumption of Ni is that At+iAt +ut+1, whereA is an actual value and uis
a random error. Hence the forecast here is =A(the preliminary estimate of the
current value of the series). N2 specifies that At+1 =At+ + andthe
corresponding forecast is + Theassumption of N2* is that At+i =At+
+ where is the average value of past changes in the given series as available
to the forecaster from the historical record (for GNP, the starting date of that record is
1947). Hence, the206 The Business Cycle Today
As shown in the three last columns of the table, the ratios Mp/MN are
definitely less than Iin all cases; that is, the root mean square errors are
smaller for the forecasts than for any of the three extrapolative or naive
models (Mp <MN). For each of the forecast sets, R1 is the smallest andR2
the largest of the ratios, with R2* ranking in the middle; simple averages of
the ratios for the eight sets are 0.32 for R1, 0.49 for R2* and 0.66 for R2*.
This means that, of these models, Ni gives the weakest and N2 the strongest
results for GNPinthe years from 1953 through 1969. But these are all
exceedingly simple models, which ought to be viewed generally as providing
only minimal standards of predictive accuracy. Although models such as N2
and N2* can be relatively effective for series with pronounced trends which
are approximately linear over the periods covered, it will be desirable in
further work to confront the GNPforecastswith more stringent yardsticks
such as autoregressive predictions with certain optimal properties.
3.2 Forecasts Before and Since 1964
In Table 2, the GNPforecastrecords summarized in the preceding section
are analyzed for two separate subperiods: one beginning in 1953 or later and
ending in 1963, the other including the years 1964—69. The table shows that
the root mean square errors of the level forecasts for the latter period
exceeded their counterparts for the former period in each case and often by
relatively large margins (columns 1 and 5). For all eight sets, these Mp figures
average about $10 billion in the periods through 1963, $15 billion in the
years 1964—69, and $12 billion in all years covered.
However, larger absolute errors do not necessarily denote worse forecasts.
The size of errors depends on the size (as well as dispersion) of the values to
be predicted. In forecasts of two series with similar behavior, the errors for
the series that has lower levels are likely to be smaller on the average (e.g.,
GNP in 1958 dollars is predicted with smaller absolute errors than GNP in
current dollars). GNP measured in current dollars rose from $365 billion to
$589 billion between 1953 and 1963 and from $629 billion to $932 billion
between 1964 and 1969; the observed increase in the average forecast errors
appears rather moderate when compared to the contrast between the average
levels of GNP in the two periods. Indeed, the ratios R1 are on the whole
much smaller for the GNP forecasts relating to 1964—69 than for those
relating to the pre-1964 years (Table 2, columns 2 and 6). Thus, comparisons
with the naive "same-level" projections show the more recent predictions in
betterlightthantheearlierones.
The ratios R2* also are decidedly lower for the 1964—69 forecasts than
for the pre-1964 ones (columns 4 and 8). It can be said, then, that the GNP
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the mean annual change in GNP measured cumulatively over the postwar
years.
In contrast, the R2 ratios present a picture that is clearly unfavorable to
the more recent forecasts inall but two sets (columns 3 and 7). For
1953—63, these ratios are concentrated in the 0.4 to 0.6 range; for 1964—69,
in the 0.8 to 1.1 range. In periods of steady growth without turning points
and major retardations,suchasthe middle andlatesixties, the N2
extrapolations of last change in GNP have a great advantage; in times of
weaker trends and stronger cyclical movements, such as the post-Korean
decade, this model performs much worse.
Inspection of the underlying series of individual forecasts and their errors
shows that underestimation of growth was much more pronounced in
1964—69 than in the earlier period. The average year-to-year change in GNP
(disregarding sign) was, $22.2 billion in 1953—63 and $55.6 billion in
1964—69; the corresponding averages for the predicted change are $21.7
billion and $46.5 billion.3 1Theannual forecasts of GNP for 1953—63
include 43 underestimates, 25 overestimates, and 7 turning-point or direc-
tional errors (among the 75 forecasts included, six relate to declines in actual
values, and they include three under- and three overestimates). The forecasts
for 1964—69 include 41 underestimates and 7 overestimates; no actual
declines occurred, and none were predicted, so the class of turning-point
errors is here empty. These results are consistent with those obtained from a
different sample of pre-1964 forecasts in [29]: as reported in section 2.3
above, underestimation has been related primarily to jricreases in series with
dominant upward trends.
The rankings of the forecasters according to the average size of errors as
measured by Mp and according to any of the R ratios are very different in the
twosubperiods. The rankcorrelations based ontheentriesinthe
corresponding columns (1 and 5, 2 and 6, etc.) of Table 2 are all virtually
zero.32 In terms of these ranks, sets A, G, and L have slipped, the last two
considerably, and sets K and (especially) C and M have gained better relative
positions (for B and F, no determinate shifts in ranks are observed). These
31These averages cover all eight forecast sets included in Table 2 and are weighted by
the numbers of observations in each set. The averages for the actual change include the
actual values that correspond to all these predictions and are analogously weighted.
32The ratios Mp/MN have a common denominator for all the forecasts in a given
period (it is a certain specific value of MN1 for the ratios R1, of MN2 for the ratios R2,
etc.). Ranking the forecasts according to any of the ratios must, therefore, yield the
same results as ranking according to if the periods covered are the same. In the
present case, however, the periods differ, and hence the rank correlations also differ
slightly. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are as follows (the subscripts refer
to the columns of Table 2): p15 =—0.047;p26 =+0.024;p37 =+0.024;andp48 =
—0.190.— _ w W
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findings tend to agree with those reported previously on the apparent lack of
consistencyinforecasters'performance from yeartoyear[29,pp.
130—132].
Table 3 shows some measures of absolute and relative accuracy for
selected forecasts of the major expenditure components of GNP, using errors
computed by taking differences between the predicted and the actual
percentage changes. The dollar levels of these series differ greatly and errors
of forecasts relating to these levels, or to the corresponding dollar changes,
lack all comparability between such variables. An analysis in terms of relative
change errors is more appropriate.
Although the level errors are on the average larger for the 1964—69 GNP
forecaststhan for the pre-1964 forecasts, as shown in Table 2, the opposite
applies to the relative change errors (Table 3, forecast sets B, C, and F for
GNP, columns1and 4). For the investment and government expenditure
forecasts, too, the relative-change errors in the earlier years tend to exceed
those in 1964—69, while for the consumption forecasts the errors in the two
subperiods differ little (columns 1 and 4).
The average errors in predicting year-to-year percentage changes are much
smaller in forecasts of personal consumption expenditures than in forecasts of
gross private domestic investment (GPDI) in either subperiod and in the total
period covered. The errors for the residential construction component are
even larger than those for total GPDI, while the errors for government
expenditures tend to exceed the errors for consumption but are also much
smaller than those for investment (columns 1, 4, and 7). These results parallel
the findings in [29, pp. 36-40].
With a few exceptions, the R1 and R2 ratios in Table 3 fall below unity,
indicating that these forecasts are more accurate than the corresponding
naive-model projections.33 For consumption and government expenditures,
the Ni model generally works worse than the N2 model (i.e., R1 < R2),
while for GPDI the contrary is true. For residential construction,R1 >R2 in
the earlier years and R1 < R2 in 1964-69, but the differences are relatively
small. The ratios, R
1are in virtually all cases larger for the investment
variables (particularly residential construction) than for consumption and
government expenditures; the R2 ratios are in nearly two-thirds of the
comparisons larger for the investment variables.
From the evidence of the R1 ratios one would infer that these forecasts
have on the whole improved in recent years, but the R2 ratios present a
mixed picture: for consumption and GPDI, they are higher in 1964-69 than
in earlier years; for the housing and government expenditures, they are lower.
33mree ratios for residential construction forecasts and one for a government
expenditures forecast are larger than 1. These cases include two R1 and two R2 ratios
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In sum, the record does not show that the assembled forecasts generally
have either improved or deteriorated in the recent years. Comparisons of level
forecasts limited to some of the benchmark models (N1,N2*) would have
suggested improvement, but this merely reflects the fact that these models
themselves are less effective for GNP in the mid- and late sixties than in the
preceding decade; the opposite applies to N2 and when this model is used as a
yardstick theforecasts appear to have worsed. The average errors in
predicting annual percentage changes have become smaller for the forecasts of
GNP and some of its major expenditure components, both absolutely and
relative to the corresponding errors of the NI model; but again the
comparisons with N2 suggest in large part the opposite. Thus the results vary
for thedifferent forecastsets, variables, and criteria. One can merely
speculate about why a more general and definite improvement has not been
achieved.34
3.3 Some Comparisons with Governmental Forecasts of GNP, 1962—69.
Forecasts of annual percentage changes in GNP and the general price level
prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) can be taken or
inferred from the Economic Report of the President for the years since 1962.
Moore has reconstructed these important predictions in [19] .InTable 4, the
CEA forecasts of GNP are compared with the actual values and with some
selected private predictions for each of the successive years
The CEA forecasts underestimate the actual percentage changes of GNP in
each year except 1962 and 1967, and so do the average private forecasts
(represented by mean predictions for the eight sets used in Tables 1 and 2).
The underestimation errors are smaller in the CEA forecasts than in the
34The expectation that forecasts should improve is based in the first place on the
general view of forecasting as a cumulative learning process. However, some practitioners
take the skeptical position that changes in the economy are often such as to make the
experience gained in the period past a weak guide to the future. Since the economy
followed a more stable upward course in 1964—69 than in the preceding decade, which
included three business recessions, one might contend that the recent years were easier
to predict. But it can also be argued that excessive reliance on lessons of the previous
period of economic hesitancy has contributed to the conservativeness of so many
forecasts in the more recent years of stronger growth and inflation.
35The CEA forecasts listed in Table 4, line 2, are updated figures from [19]-The
actual values in line 1 are computed from the first Commerce estimates that are also used
elsewhere in my analysis of the accuracy of GNP forecasts. They differ but slightly from
the actual values used by Moore in [19], which are the first official estimates given in
the President's Economic Report. The divergencies never exceed ± 0.1 percentage points,
and the mean of the actual percentage changes, disregarding sign, is the same according















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.214 The Business Cycle Today
average privateforecastsinall but one year; on the other hand, the
overestimate for 1962 is considerably larger in the CEA forecast (Table 4,
lines 1—3). The average errors disregarding sign show only a minute difference
in favor of the CEA predictions, which may or may not be significant (lines 4
and 5, with the summary figures in column 10).
Of the eight private forecast sets, K has a somewhat lower mean absolute
error than the CEA forecasts, and two sets F and C show errors that are on
the average not much larger (lines 6—8). Set K also underestimates the rates
of growth in GNP a trifle less than the CEA forecasts, but the other two sets
show stronger underestimation tendencies (as shown by the size of the
negative mean errors in column 9). Of the five sets not individually included
in Table 4, all have larger mean absolute errors (ranging from 1.4 to 1.8
percentage points), and in only one is the underestimation lower than that of
the forecasts that are included.36
Comparisons with the three simple benchmark models, Ni, N2, and N2*,
indicate that the forecasts represented in Table 4 are all definitely superior to
such extrapolatiOns. The average errors disregarding sign are 7.1, 1.9, and 3.6
percentage points for the NI, N2, and N2* projections, respectively.37
Finally, the examination of all available annual forecasts of GNP suggests
that the variability of predictions from year to year tends to be greater than
the variability of predictions by different forecasters in a given period. I
suspect that this is indeed often so and not confined to this particular variable
and period, for the following reasons (which, although plausible, are also
difficult to test): For all their diversity, which is considerable, forecasts for a
given macroeconomic variable in a given period must have much in common
because competent forecasters use to a large extent the same data and similar
methods, are exposed to the same major current events and prevailing
expectations, and possibly influence each other directly. Hence one might
expect many forecasters to share at one time in a common success and at
36The predictions in set G consist of four overestimates and four underestimates (in
1965—69) and have a mean error of —0.21 and a mean absolute error of 1.38 percentage
points.
37The mean errors, listed in the same order, axe —7.1, —0.6, and —3.6 percentage
points. The NI criterion is, of course, an extremely weak one for a series growing as fast
and as steadily as GNPinthe 1960's, and itis merely noted here as one of the
conventional yaidsticks. The N2* benchmark model used to be rather effective for the
earlier postwar period; when applied to forecasts concentrated in the years 1953—63 this
model produced generally more accurate projections than either Ni or N2 [29, pp.
83—901. The deterioration in the performance of N2* in the more recent years is clearly
due to the increased growth rates in GNP as compared with the earlier postwar period.
The relative stability of the growth rates in the period covered naturally works strongly
in favor of the N2 model.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 215
another in a common failure (using these terms in a broad and relative sense).
As for the variability over time of economic forecasts and their errors, this
reflects mainly economic instability which has many forms and causes; some
types of economic change are more difficult to predict than others and
different types prevail at different times.
3.4 Some Multiperiod Forecasts by Business Economists
Some of the collected forecast sets provide chains of predictions made at a
given date for two or more successive periods. Thus set A includes forecasts
made annually for two and four quarters ahead; set C, forecasts made at
somewhat irregular intervals four times per year for spans ranging from one to
five quarters; and set G, forecasts made semiannually for spans varying from
one to six quarters. Table 5 shows the root mean square errors of the GNP
predictionsfrom two of these sources and also the ratios of these Mp figures
to the corresponding statistics for the naive models Ni and N2.
The Mp figures virtually always increase with the span of the predictions in
any of the periods covered, i.e.,since 1964 and before (there are no
exceptions of this rule in the cases illustrated in Table 5, columns 1, 4, and
7). The increments of Mp in the successive quarters vary considerably,
however, and show no tendency either to rise or fall; so the marginal errors
are not necessarily larger for the more distant quarters than for those in the
nearest future and may even be occasionally smaller. To put it differently, the
increase in the average errors is typically less than proportional to the increase
in the forecast span.
The R1 ratios are all smaller than I and are concentrated in the range
between 0.4 and 0.6 for any of the spans and periods covered (but they are,
in most cases, somewhat larger in the period since 1964 than before; see
columns 2,5, and 8). This means that all these forecasts are better
(approximately twice as accurate on the average, in terms of the root mean
square errors of the level forecasts) than the same-level projections of the
benchmark model Ni.
The R2 ratios also are smaller than 1 for all included forecasts that refer to
the periods before 1964 and thetotal periods covered, but they are
throughout appreciably larger than1for the forecasts relating to the
1964—69 period (columns 3, 6, and 9). This confirms that thelast-change
projections with the naive model N2 present a rather difficult standard of
comparison for the GNP forecasts in the second half of the 1960's (see the
high R2 ratios for the annual GNP predictions of 1964—69 in Table 2,
column 7).
As the span of forecast is extended, the ratios R1 and R2 decrease more





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 217
all observations in Table 5, declines in the ratios prevail over rises 30 to 12,
and for the largest samples (total forecast periods) the dominance of the
declines is even more marked (11 to 3). Hence it appears that the forecasts
tend to improve relative to both naive models as the span lengthens.
The quarterly and multiperiod forecasts for the recent years, like the
annual forecasts, make a better showing when evaluated in terms of errors of
relative change instead of level errors (compare the measures for the annual
GNP predictions in Tables 2 and 3). In the course of the present study, the
absolute and relative accuracy of the updated multiperiod forecasts of relative
changes in the major expenditure components of GNPwasexamined, but
only a brief statement about the general results of this analysis is warranted
here.3 8
Theaverage errors of forecasts of consumption expenditures, gross private
domestic investment, government spending, and several components of these
categories, are all found to increase with the span of prediction, for the most
part monotonically. However, the marginal errors of these forecasts do not
increase systematically, that is, the average errors do not increase as fast as
the span of forecast. The R1 and R2 ratios become in most cases lower as the
forecasts reach further out into the future, indicating that the longer-range
predictions are more accurate relative to the naive models than the short
ones.39 All of this agrees with, and amplifies, the findings obtained for the
GNP forecasts, as summarized above.
Relatively few of the percentage change forecasts examined have root
mean square errors exceeding those of the naive models (i.e., R1 ,R2> 1),
even in the 1964—69 period. Exceptions are the forecasts of residential
construction and net change in inventories, for which a large proportion of
the R1 ratios are larger than unity. Generally, NI is more effective than N2
for these variables and gross private domestic investment as a whole (that is,
R1 tends to exceed R2 here), while the opposite applies to consumption and
government expenditures.
38The reason is that this material comes largely from one forecast set that is rather
unlike the others in our collection of private judgmental forecasts, namely, set C, which
evolved froma more informal forecast toward one that relies importantly on
relationships estimated with an econometric model. These results, though interesting, are
therefore somewhat limited in scope; yet it would take considerable space to present
them in a more specific form.
39C1ianges in the R1 ratios associated with successive one-quarter increases in the
forecast spans consist of decreases in nearly two-thirds of the observations, while for the
R2 ratios the over-all proportion of decreases is over three-fourths. This includes the
results for both the subperiods and the total forecast periods; when only the latter are
considered, the connection of increasing spans with declining R ratios becomes more
pronounced, particularly for R 2.218 The Business Cycle Today
3.5 Ex Ante and Ex Post Forecasts with Two Econometric Models
Recently, Haitovsky and Treyz have brought up to date and extended the
analysisoftheforecastingpropertiesof two econometricmodels,
Wharton-EFU and OBE, which was first presented in [9]. I owe the data
used in Table 6 to their courtesy.
The mean absolute errors of the ex ante forecasts (MAE-XA) for eight
selected variables show the usual tendency to increase with the predictive
span, from one to four quarters. There are only a few exceptions to this rule
among the measures for the Wharton model (column 1), and none among
those for the OBE model (column 4). However, the successive increments in
these errors do not increase systematically, that is, the errors in predicting the
first quarter are not always smaller on the average than the errors in
predicting the second quarter, etc. In other words, the errors do not double
and triple as the span of forecasts doubles and triples; in fact, they most often
increase less than in proportion to the span, although no uniform and regular
relationships emerge between these variables. All this agrees qualitatively with
the findings for the judgmental forecasts as noted in [29, Chap. 5] and earlier
in this paper.
The forecasts in question are the authentic ex ante predictions that involve
judgmental adjustments of the constant terms by the Wharton and OBE
forecasters. Several alternative mechanical adjustments were applied to the
two models in[9]and again the updated version of [91. The forecasts
obtained with these reproducible adjustments tend to be less accurate than
the true cx ante forecasts, often by substantial margins. Without any
adjustments at all, the forecasts turn out to be still worse.
Ratios of the MAE-XA figures to the mean absolute errors of the simplest
naive-model projections (Ni or N2, whichever proved more effective for the
given variable) are listed in Table 6, columns 2 (Wharton-EFU) and 5 (OBE).
For GNP in current and constant dollars, the implicit price deflator, and
consumption expenditures on durable goods other than automobiles, N2 gave
better predictions, hence the ratio shown is MAE-XA/MAE-N2. For the other
four variables——expenditures on automobiles and on plant and equipment,
net change in inventories, and the unemployment rate——Ni worked better
and the entries correspondingly refer to the ratio MAE-XA/MAE-Nl.
For both Wharton and OBE, the ratios for the forecasts of GNP in
constant dollars are generally lower than those for current-dollar GNP (lines
1—10). The Wharton forecasts for GNP had larger errors than N2 (i.e., the
ratios exceed 1) for the two shortest spans; the OBE forecasts had the larger
errors for all but the shortest span. These poor results are apparently to a
large extent due to very unsatisfactory price-level forecasts. Most of the ratios.
for GNP in 1958 dollars are smaller than 1 but several are not much smallerForecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 219
TABLE6
Wharton and OBE Model Ex Ante Forecasts of Eight Selected Variables over
Varying Spans, Comparisons with Naive Model Extrapolations
and Ex Post Model Forecasts, 1966—69











quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GNP (N2; billions of current dollars)
1. One 3.8 105 0.63 2.1 0.68 0.49
2.Two 7.8 1.04 0.78 7.8 1.07 0.89
3. Three 10.4 0.82 0.89 12.7 0.99 0.93
4. Four 12.6 0.71 0.89 19.4 1.21 1.01
5. Next year 6.6 0.61 0.76 11.5 1.21 1.03
GNP (N2; billions of 1958 dollars)
6.One 2.8 0.91 0.56 1.8 0.64 0.77
7.Two 5.7 0.96 0.68 4.8 0.83 1.04
8. Three 7.2 0.71 0.68 7.0 0.64 0.95
9. Four 6.7 0.46 0.55 9.4 0.66 0.93
10. Next year 5.3 0.62 0.66 6.1 0.78 1.06
GNP Implicit Price Deflator (N2; 1958 =100)
11. One 0.7 1.14 1.07 0.3 1.65 1.22
12. Two 1.0 1.17 1.27 0.6 1.78 1.33
13. Three 1.3 1.21 1.49 1.1 1.68 1.36
14. Four 1.8 1.40 1.62 1.5 1.89 1.30
15. Next year 1.1 1.22 1.38 0.9 1.41
Consumption Expenditures—Automobiles (Ni; billions of current dollars)
16. One 1.5 1.13 0.89 1.6 1.23 0.91
17.Two 2.0 0.94 1.00 2.3 0.96 0.87
18. Three 2.8 0.96 1.00 3.2 0.88 0.84
19. Four 2.9 0.71 0.86 4.5 0.88 0.86
20.Nextyear 2.0 0.82 0.98 3.0 0.89 0.85








(no. ofMAE.XAc MAE-N MAE-XPMAE.X.4c MAE-N MAE-XF
quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption Expenditures—Durables, Nonautomotive (N2; billions of current dollars)
21. One 1.4 1.36 1.07 0.7 0.83 1.00
22. Two 1.6 1.07 1.10 0.7 0.53 0.99
23. Three 2.2 1.47 1.15 1.1 0.86 1.09
24. Four 2.6 1.04 1.03 1.7 0.84 1.15
25.Nextyear1.9 1.30 1.21 0.8 0.72 1.19
Investment in Plant and Equipment (Ni; billions of current dollars)
26. One 1.9 0.87 0.91 1.6 0.66 0.93
27. Two 3.8 1.13 0.84 2.6 0.68 0.87
28. Three 4.2 0.97 0.84 2.9 0.52 0.80
29. Four 3.8 0.70 0.91 4.2 0.56 0.82
30. Next year2.8 0.87 0.89 2.1 0.47 0.84
Net Change in Inventories (Ni; billions of current dollars)
31. One 3.7 0.74 0.93 2.7 0.65 0.98
32. Two 4.8 1.13 0.92 3.2 1.02 1.05
33. Three 4.1 0.94 0.78 3.6 1.47 0.92
34. Four 3.8 0.70 0.71 4.3 1.31 0.85
35. Next year3.5 0.87 0.88 2.3 0.80 1.02
Unemployment Rate (N 1; per cent of labor force)
36. One 0.2 2.09 0.68 0.1 0.92 0.92
37. Two 0.4 2.05 0.69 0.2 1.15 0.80
38. Three 0.5 2.00 0.52 0.3 1.16 0.64
39. Four 0.5 2.38 0.52 0.5 1.71 0.73
40. Next year0.4 2.47 0.60 0.3 1.58 0.77
aFor 111-1966—111-1969. The number of forecasts included in the averages for this model,
for all the variables covered and all three forecasts (ex ante, XA; cx post,.XP, and naive, N)
varies with the predictive span as follows: one quarter, 13;two quarters, 12; three quarters,
11;four quarters, 10; next year, 10.
bFor 11-1967—111-1969 The numbers of XA and N forecasts included in theaverages for
this model vary with the predictive span as follows: one quarter, 10; two quarters, 9; three
quarters, 8; four quarters, 7; next year, 7. These samples of observations are used for theForecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 221
Notes to Table 6 (concluded)
entries in columns 4 and 5. The number of XP forecasts are the same, with these
exceptions: four quarters, 6; next year, 6. These somewhat smaller samples are used for
the entries in column 6.
CMAE..XA denotes the mean absolute error of the ex ante forecasts.
dRatjo of MAE-XA to the mean absolute error of a naive model (MAE-N). Ni
projections axe used in the ratios for some variables and N2 projections for others,
depending on which of the two naive models worked better in the given case. The
selected model is identified in parentheses after the subtitle for each variable.
eRatio of MAE-XA to the mean absolute error of the ex post forecasts (MAE-XP).
The ex post forecasts use the same adjustments of constant terms that were made by the
model builders in the corresponding ex ante forecasts. See text.
and two are larger (the poor results include the two shortest Wharton
forecasts and the OBE forecasts beyond one quarter). The ratios for the
predictions of the price deflator all exceed unity and are particularly large for
the OBE model (lines 11—15).
The results are also poor (in the sense of "less accurate than the better of
the naive models") for the shortest forecasts of spending on automobiles and
for the Wharton forecasts of spending on other durables, while the other
predictions for these two variables pass these tests with more success (lines
16—25). The comparisons for the two investment variables (lines 26—35) are
on the whole more favorable to the forecasts, although some of the ratios,
here too, are high, as, for example, the OBE predictions of the inventory
change over longer spans. The worst results (highest ratios) are for the
unemployment forecasts, especially in the Wharton model (lines 36—40).
It is disappointing that these forecasts, based as they are on well-known
and rather elaborate econometric models, do not score better in comparison
with simple naive-model projections; but this outcome must be seen in its
proper historical context, and its importance must not be exaggerated. The
forecast periods are short (111-1966—111-1969 for Wharton, 1-1967—111-1969
for OBE) and they cover no declines in such variables as GNPincurrent and
constant dollars and the price deflator but only strong and fairly steady
upward trends. The growth trend was not much less dominant even in the
expendituresfor consumer durables excluding automobiles.Itis not
surprising that the N2 model gave relatively good results for these series in
this particular period, and it is clear that at some other times this model
would not perform nearly as well. Probably more significant is the failure of
these econometric forecasts to achieve better scores relative to the Ni
benchmark for the more volatile series: the expenditures on automobiles,
investment in plant and equipment, net change in inventories, and the
unemployment rate.222 The Business Cycle Today
Table 6 also includes comparisons of ex ante with ex post forecasts in the
form of ratios of the corresponding mean absolute errors, MAE-XA/MAE-XP
(columns 3 and 6). The ex post forecasts incorporate the same original
constant-term adjustment as the ex ante ones. This makes the comparisons
more meaningful; moreover, the ex post forecasts are, on the whole, more
accurate with these adjustments than with the mechanical adjustments or, a
fortiori, without any adjustments at all.
Most of the ratios MAE-XA/MAE-XP in Table 6 are smaller than 1,
particularly for the Wharton model, indicating that the ex ante forecasts tend
to be more accurate than the ex post ones with the same original adjustments.
However, the ratios exceed unity for 1±Wharton and the OBE predictions of
the price deflator and of expenditures on consumer durables other than
automobiles (lines 11—15 and 21—25).
The Wharton ex post forecasts are less accurate than the selected naive
models in half of the cases examined, including most of those relating to GNP
in1958 dollars, expenditures on durables excluding automobiles, and the
unemployment rate.4° The OBE ex post forecasts also have larger MAE'S
than the naive models in about half of the forty cases covered in Table 6. It is
interesting to note that among the OBE predictions those of nominal GNP,
expenditures on automobiles, and unemployment compare unfavorably,
whilevirtuallyallotherscomparefavorably,withthebenchmark
extrapolations.
3.6TheRelative Accuracy of Econometric Model Forecasts and Judgmental
Forecasts
It is difficult to get meaningful comparisons of errors for these two classes
of predictions. On the one hand, forecasts made without an explicitly
formulated econometric model are much more numerous than forecasts made
with such a model, and they also cover longer periods of time than the ex
ante model predictions (this applies particularly to quarterly forecasts). On
the other hand, for the short periods they do cover, the econometric model
forecasts are generally much more regular and complete than the others. All
inall, there are not very many forecasts in the two categories that are
"strictly" comparable in the sense of having been made at about the same
time for the same target period.
40Ratios of MAE-XP to MAE-N for the Wharton modelcan be obtained by dividing
the entries in column 2 by the corresponding entries hicolumn3 of Table 6. "Less
accurate" forecasts are those for which the ratio is greater than 1 (column 2 greater than
column 3). Similarly, by taking the ratios of the corresponding entries in columns 5 and
6 of the table, MAE-XP can be compared with MAE-N for the OBE model.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 223
Table 7 collects such forecasts for the Wharton model and four sets of
business economists' forecasts and compares their mean absolute errors over
spans of from one to four quarters. The forecasts refer to GNPincurrent and
constant dollars and include both ex ante and ex post model forecasts (with
the original judgmental adjustments).
The errors of the Wharton ex ante forecasts of GNP are on the average
smaller than those of the judgmental forecasts in sets A, G, and S; in only two
of these comparisons are the ratios MAE-XA/MAE-P larger than 1, though the
ratios for set S are all high, exceeding 0.8 (Table 7, lines 1—4, 9—16). The
forecasts of set C, however, tend to produce somewhat smaller errors than the
Wharton model (as shown by the ratios in lines 5—8, column 5, only one of
which falls below unity). But the set C forecasts themselves are in the recent
years based largely on an econometric model used flexibly by the economic
staff of the company that formulated it; hence these comparisons are not so
much between forecasts with econometric models and judgmental forecasts as
between academic and private business forecasts both of which exemplify the
model-cum-judgment approach.
The Wharton ex post forecasts of GNP score on the whole less well relative
to the judgmental forecasts. They appear to be in most cases less accurate
than forecasts C and not much more accurate than forecasts G and S, while
the comparisons with set A produce a very mixed picture (columns 3, 4, and
6).
For GNP in constant dollars, both the ex ante and the ex post forecasts
with the Wharton model tend to have larger mean absolute errors than the
predictions from sets C and S and smaller MAE'S than the predictions from
set G (Table 7, lines 17—27).
In Table 8, which has exactly the same format as Table 7, the relative
accuracy of the OBE model and the judgmental forecasts is analyzed. The ex
antepredictions of GNP with the OBE model are better than the
corresponding predictions of sets A and G (lines l—3, 8—11, columns 2, 4,
and 5). In comparisons with sets C and S, however, only the shortest OBE
forecasts come out ahead (lines 4—7, 12—15).
The OBE ex post forecasts of GNP likewise present a mixed picture. The
MAE ratios are here larger than I in most comparisons with forecasts C and S,
but smaller than 1 in virtually all comparisons with sets A and C (Table 8,
columns 3,4, and 6).
Similarly to the Wharton forecasts, the OBE forecasts of real GNP, both cx
ante and ex post, have for the most part larger average errors than sets C and
S (but the opposite applies to some of the shortest forecasts), while set G is
here definitely inferior (Table 8, lines 16—26).224 The Business Cycle Today
TABLE 7
Comparisons of Average Errors of Wharton Model and Judgmental
Forecasts over Span of from One to Four Quarters, 1966—69


















quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Set A (1-1967—111-1969)
1.One 3 5.1 12.5 6.6 0.77 1.90
2.Two 3 6.9 10.0 11.9 0.58 0.84
3. Three 3 8.8 5.3 13.5 0.65 0.39
4. Four 2 14.8 14.4 14.0 1.06 1.03
Set C (111-1966—111-1969)
5. One 6 4.8 8.1 3.4 1.41 2.38
6. Two 6 7..! 8.4 7.0 1.01 1.20
7.Three 6 9.8 9.5 10.9 0.90 0.87
8.Four 5 15.2. 15.8 11.8 1.29 1.34
Set G (1-1967—111-1969)
9.One 6 5.2 8.4 7.5 0.69 1.12
10. Two 5 8.0 8.3 15.2 0.53
11. Three 5 10.3 7.1 21.2 0.49 0.87
12. Four 4 17.1 12.6 29.8 0.57 0.94
Set S (111-1968—111-1969)
13. One 5 4.9 5.6 5.7 0.86 0.98
14.Two 4 10.5 8.9 10.6 0.99 0.84
15. Three 3 18.2 15.0 17.2 1.06 0.87
16. Four 2 19.1 22.6 24.0 0.80 0.94
Set C (111-1966—111-1969)
17. One 6 4.2 6.8 2.8 1.50 2.43
18.Two 6 5.6 6.9 4.9 1.14 1.41
19. Three 6 6.3 9.2 6.0 1.05 1.53
20. Four 5 7.4 14.2 4.8 1.54 2.96Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 225
Table 7 (concluded)
Set C (1-1967—111-1969)
21. One 6 4.1 7.1 5.6 0.73 1.27
22. Two 5 5.9 6.2 11.2 0.53 0.55
23. Three 5 5.6 6.2 16.0 0.35 0.49
24. Four 4 6.6 10.0 22.5 0.29 0.44
Set S (1114968_1114969)e
25. One 4 1.9 4.7 1.9 1.00 2.4.7
26. Two 3 3.8 6.3 1.1 3.45 5.73
27. Three 2 4.9 7.6 0.8 6.12 9.50
aRefers to the corresponding entries in each of columns 2, 3, and 4.
denotes predictions in one of the sets identified in the subtitles below (set A, C.,
or S). Set S represents the American Statistical Association—NBER quarterly Business
Outlook Survey (group median forecasts). For a brief description of the other forecast
sets, see text.
CRatio of column 2 to column 4.
of column 3 to column 4.
eThe four-quarter forecasts could be compared for.a single period only and are
therefore omitted.
The MAE ratios for either mode! show no general and systematic tendency
either to increase or decrease with the span of the forecast. However, the
ratios do increase markedly with the span in some cases, notably for the OBE
cx ante forecasts in comparisons with set C and all the model forecasts in
comparisons with set S (Table 7, lines 25—27, and Table 8, lines 16—19 and
24—26). Thus, possibly with the above exceptions, thesegroups of forecasts
apparently do not possess any strong differential advantages or disadvantages
that would depend specifically on the span of forecast.
To sum up these findings, the ex ante forecasts with Wharton and OBE
models hold a slight edge over the judgmental forecasts, theiraverage errors
being the smaller ones in 58.5 per cent of the cases.41 The cx post forecasts
with these models are on balance only about as accurate as the forecasts in
the other four Sets (the two models show smaller errors in 50.9 per cent of
the cases).42
These results should not be used for any extensive generalizations and
must indeed be interpreted very cautiously because they are based on small
samples limited (as. already noted) by the scarcity of data for different
41For the Wharton model alone, the percentage is 55.6; for the OBE model, 61.5.
42Again, to quote the corresponding percentages separately for thetwo models:
Wharton, 48.1 per cent; OBE, 53.8 per cent.226 The Business Cycle Today
TABLE 8
Comparisons of Average Errors of OBE Model and
Judgmental Forecasts over Spans of from One to Four Quarters, 1967—69




















quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Set A
1.One 2 1.8 6.9 6.8 0.26 1.01
2.Two 2 11.0 2.7 13.4 0.82 0.20
3. Three 2 14.8 4.9 17.8 0.83 0.28
Set C (111-1967—111-1969)
4. One 4 2.9 7.1 3.9 0.75 1.82
5. Two 4 10.6 9.4 7.1 1.49 1.32
6. Three 4 15.5 13.7 14.6 1.06 0.94
7. Four 3 21.3 19.9 18.4 1.18 1.08
Set G (111-1967—111-1969)
8. One 5 2.4 5.8 8.7 0.28 0.67
9.Two 4 10.6 9.4 17.0 0.62 0.55
10. Three 4 15.5 13.7 21.8 0.71 0.63
11. Four 3 21.3 19.9 31.7 0.67 0.63
Set S (111-1968—111-1969)
12. One 5 2.9 4.8 5.6 0.52 0.86
13. Two 4 9.7 12.7 10.6 0.92 1.20
14. Three 3 17.3 21.2 17.1 1.01 1.24
15. Four 2 24.2 30.6 23.7 1.02 1.29
Set C (111-1967—111-1969)
16. One 4 2.3 4.2 3.4 0.68 1.24
17. Two 4 6.5 4.3 5.5 1.18 0.78
18. Three 4 9.8 7.5 7.4 1.32 1.01
19. Four 3 12.8 11.6 5.7 2.25 2.04Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 227
Table 8 (concluded)
Set G (111-1967—111-1969)
20. One 5 2.0 3.7 6.5 0.31 0.57
21.Two 4 6.5 43 13.3 0.49 0.32
22. Three 4 9.8 7.5 17.4 0.56 0.43
23. Four 3 12.8 11.6 25.5 0.50 0.45
Set S (111..1968_111..1969)e
24. One 4 1.3 1.5 1.9 0.68 0.79
25.Two 3 2.0 3.0 1.2 1.67 2.50
26. Three 2, 2.5 3.0 1.2 2.08 2.50
aRefers to the corresponding entries in each of the columns 2, 3, and 4.
denotes predictions in one of the sets identified in the subtitles below (set A, C, G,
or S). Set S represents the American Statistical Association—NBER quarterly Business
Outlook Survey (group median forecasts). For a brief description of the other forecast
sets, see text.
CRatio of column 2 to column 4.
dRatio of column 3 to column 4.
eThe four-quarter forecasts could be compared for a single period only and are there-
fore omitted.
forecasts that can be matched by span and target period. Since intertemporal
variations in errors of predictions from a given source are often large, it is
possible that at least some of the details in the picture presented by these
comparisons reflect strongly the particularities of the periods covered and
would not be upheld by the evidence from larger samples.43
4. Suggested Agenda for Future Research
4.1 Focus and Feasibility of the New Studies
The results of past and Current studies summarized in the two preceding
sections of this report, and the experience and materials accumulated in the
43cornparisons of the MAE-XA figures in Table 6, columns 1 and 4, withthose in
Tables 7 and 8, columns 2, show that the average errors in GNP forecasts with both the
Wharton and the OBE model have been for the most part larger in the selected periods
than in the total forecast periods. Of the other GNP forecasts, set C appears to be
favored by the selection, in the sense of having a smaller MAE in the periods covered in
Tables 7 and 8 than at other times, whereas the opposite applies to set G. If average
errors of all GNP predictions available from each of these sources were used, that is, if all
differences in the periods covered were disregarded, the comparisons with some of the
other forecasts, notably those of set C, would be definitely more favorable to the ex ante
forecasts with the two econometric models. For the ex post forecasts and the real GNP
predictions, the results of a similar analysis axe mixed.228 The Business Cycle Today
process of this research, indicate both the need for and the promise of further
work on thortterm economic forecasts and forecasting models. They also
provide a good basis for planning and executing such work.
The planned research consists of several related projects that share a focus
on the problem of how predictive accuracy is related to the method and
structure of the forecasts.This presupposes (a)that the accuracy of
predictions of different types and from different sources can be measured and
compared, and (b) that the methods used by forecasters and the ingredients
of forecasts can be ascertained and analyzed. No doubt, neither of these
conditions is fully met, but, here as elsewhere, it is necessary to do the best
one can with unavoidably incomplete information and imperfect knowledge.
I am prepared to argue that, as a consequence of previous and current work,
itis now possible to undertake studies so oriented with a fair chance of
making a significant contribution.
Thus, regarding (a), recent studies (including those reviewed in section 2)
have achieved considerable progress in developing criteria of forecasting
accuracy and applying them to diverse forecasting data. There is much less
success to report on matters relating to (b), but it has been shown that useful
information about "judgmental" forecasts (defined as those that are not
based on an explicit forecasting "model") can be gained from comparisons of
such forecasts with predictions derived by a known, replicable method.44
Moreover, direct information is now being systematically collected about the
forecasting methods used by the participants inthe new ASA-NBER
Quarterly Survey of the Economic Outlook.45These data, then, permit a
cross-classification by both accuracy and method of a sample of business
forecasts for any particular period surveyed and over time. When sufficient
material from the successive surveys becomes available, it should be possible
to learn from it whether the quality of forecasts varies systematically with the
method used, and if so how. In seeking an answer to this question, one will be
able to control for several factors: the date of issue of the forecasts (the
survey questionnaires are collected at certain fixed times), the recent and
base-period estimates (they are given or reported), and the key assumptions
about tax and monetary policy, defense posture, government spending, and
so on (the forecasters are asked to specify them and most do).
The econometric forecasts, of course, do rely on explicitly formulated
models and certain more orlessstandardized methods of statistical
estimation. However, the cx ante forecasts with econometric models must use
judgmental predictions or estimates of the exogenous inputs, and they
44See[161, [17],and [29],passim.
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typically use various adjustments of the constant terms, which likewise
involve judgment and cannot as a rule be reproduced by extrapolative or
other mechanical procedures.46 In the past, such operations were frequently
not well recorded, and experience shows that it is difficult and sometimes
impossibletoreconstruct econometricians' forecasts without thisvital
documentation.Itisthereforeindispensableforthestudieshere
contemplated that a systematic collection of forecasts from several selected
econometric models be carried out in such a way as to include not only the
predictions that were made but also the judgmental inputs and adjustments
which, along with the known structure of the model, produced these
predictions. Full information of this type is necessary for independent
replication of the forecasts, to ensure that the appropriate models and data
(inputs and outputs) are being recorded. Steps have already been taken at the
National Bureau to initiate such a collection of quarterly econometric
forecasts and related statistics. The Wharton-EFU and the Commerce..OBE
models are being processed, as is the new quarterly Michigan model, and it is
hoped that other models will be added. Of course, the cooperation of the
model builders is essential for this effort and its success.47
4.2 Comparisons of Types and Methods of Forecasting
Economic forecasts can be classified by several different criteria such as (a)
the degree to which they use formalized methods vis-a'-vis informal judgment;
(b) the degree to which they rely on relationships among different variables
vis-a'-vis projections of past behavior of the variable to be predicted; and (c)
the degree to which they are based on averages of macropredictions or
aggregations of micropredictions from different sources global
forecasts from a single source. According to (a), a whole gradation could be
established, from forecasts that are "purely judgmental" to those produced
by fully specified and strictly implemented econometric models. According
to (b), similarly, there is, at least in principle; an ordering of forecasts from
pure extrapolations of past values of the given variable (inferring from
where i and / denote the various discrete or distributed lags that may be
involved) to outputs of equations in which is related to other variables
only, say According to (c), fmally, forecasts would be divided into
predictions by individuals and small teams, weighted or unweighted averages
46For a description and evaluation of such adjustments, see [9, section 111 and IV)
and [12, section 3.1].
47This may involve some restrictions on the scope or timing of the release of the
resulting information, but arrangements of this sort have already been made in some
cases and they should not pose any critical problems.230 The Business Cycle Today
of such predictions (including small group forecasts and large opinion polls),
aggregates based on surveys of businessmen's or consumers' anticipations, and
so on.
These various classes of forecasts overlap and can be combined in diverse
ways; the pure or extreme forms are generally used only as benchmarks of
predictive preformance, not as forecasts proper. For example, a forecast of
GNP and its major components may combine extrapolation, relationship of
the target series to known or estimated values of some other variables,
external informationsuchasasurvey of investmentintentions and
government budget estimates, and the judgment of the forecaster. This can be
and often is true of a "judgmental" forecast by a business economist as well
as of a "model" forecast by an econometrician. The main difference between
the two would be that the econometrician's model is explicitly formulated in
quantitative terms, whereas the business economist's is not. Mechanical
methods of extrapolating the series to be predicted and of relating it to other
series would then serve to provide standards against which to measure the
performance of the bona fide forecasts made by identifiable sources prior to
the event. Where such forecasts relate to variables covered by the surveys of
anticipations or intentions, the aggregated results of these surveys furnish
another important yardstick of predictive accuracy.
The currently relevant forecasting procedures can be broadly classified as
(a) extrapolative techniques; (b) surveys of intentions or anticipations by
economic decision-making units;(c)business cycle indicators; and (d)
econometric models. Each of the four methods furnishes data that constitute
ingredients of actual forecasts of the course of the economy; and each of
these four classes of data, too, can be used to construct mechanically
reproducible predictions that represent appropriate benchmarks for forecast
evaluation.Inlargepart,theproposed researchstrategyconsistsin
confronting forecasts of different types with an array of these benchmark
predictions in such a way as to extract from the comparisons as much
information aspossible about both the accuracy and structure of the
forecasts.
To use for illustration a case particularly rich in opportunities for such
comparisons,consideraneconometric model's equationforbusiness
expenditures on plant and equipment. Forecasts of this variable produced by
the econometrician armed with this model can be confronted by: (a)
corresponding extrapolations from different "naive models," including some
relatively sophisticated and effective types of autoregression; (b) aggregated
business anticipations of plant and equipment outlays (based, say, on the
OBE-SEC surveys); (c) forecasts from regressions including some appropriate
"leading indicators" such as new orders and contracts forplant andForecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 231
equipment or new capital appropriations; and (d) ex post forecasts based on
the model as a whole, or alternatively, on the single equation concerned, with
actual values used for the exogenous inputs and no judgmental adjustments of
the constant terms.48 The model may, of course, incorporate one or more of
these elements in some form and may also have other ingredients of net
predictive value, in which case it should prove superior to the benchmark(s)
in question; e.g., if the investment equation includes a lagged value of the
dependent variable along with other significant explanatory factors, then the
forecasts based on it will be better than the standard offered by predictions
from the corresponding autoregressive model. But such an outcome is by no
means always to be expected, for the model may not use fully or optimally
the information embodied in the extrapolative, anticipatory, or indicator
benchmark models, and it may contain other misspecifications. Where the
comparisons indicate such weaknesses, itis a logical next step to try to
improve the model by adding to it the elements that seem promising and
removing those that seem disturbing in the light of these tests.
Such studies, then, should not only contribute to our knowledge of the
relative accuracy of different forecasts and forecasting models (including the
benchmark models), but they should also help locate some of the areas of
strength and weakness in the underlying methods and specifications. An
analysis of this kind is likely to yield the highest returns for the forecasts
based on explicit models, but even where such models are lacking the payoff
may be considerable. For example, suppose one can demonstrate that
business forecasts from a particular source would have gained in the past by
being combined with extrapolations of some specific type (say, by means of
weights derived from a regression of the actual values on both the forecasts
and the extrapolations). If this is a sufficiently stable relationship, it may be
indicative of a systematic and correctable deficiency of the forecast.
Clearly, there are many examples in the literature of such comparisons as
are here proposed, and some useful lessons can be drawn from them. The
advantage of the suggested approach is thatit combines these familiar
elements into a framework for a more comprehensive and systematic analysis
of economic forecasting than has been hitherto attempted.
48Alternatively, certain mechanical adjustments could also be employed. In systems
with lagged terms of the endogenous variables, model-generated values for these factors
must be used to generate multiperiod forecasts (in single-equation models, such inputs
are of course limited to the values of one dependent variable). The use of anticipatory
data tends to limit the time span over which a model can be successfully extrapolated
into the future because such data are themselves difficult to predict well, as noted at the
end of section 2.8.232 The Business Cycle Today
4.3 The Qualities of Short-Term Econometric Model Forecasts
In continuation of new and significant research undertakings in this
area,49 ex ante and ex post forecasts of the principal endogenous variables
need to be compared for each of the major quarterly models of the U.S.
economy listed at the end of section 4.1. It is necessary to have several
different variants of thisanalysis:with and without such judgmental
adjustments as were made by the model builders for their forecasts, and also
with the most promising of the mechanical adjustments of the constant
terms. The results will permit assessments of (a) the magnitude and effects of
errors in the projections of the exogenous variables; (b) the quantitative
impact and relative efficiency of the different types of adjustments; and (c)
the magnitude of forecast inaccuracies that are attributable to errors in
construction and solution of the given model. It will then also be possible to
make certain inferences about the interaction of errors from these different
sources.
Both ex ante and ex post model forecasts should then be confronted by
various "naive" and autoregressive extrapolations, a sample of judgmental
forecasts,single-equationpredictions,and(ifappropriate)aggregated
micro-anticipations data from surveys. Efforts should be made to standardize
at least the sample period used, so that meaningful intermodel comparisons
can be made of the accuracy and other properties of the forecasts.
This analysis is expected to help provide answers to several interesting
questions about the relative merits and demerits of different models and
forecasts. To list some that seem particularly important: (a) What are the
desirableproperties of measures of goodness of predictions?(b) Are
predictionsfromeconometricsystemssuperiortononeconometric
predictions? (c) Do large-scale models perform better than small-scale models
in forecasting GNP and its major components? (d) Insofar as they yield to our
measurement efforts, how do the benefits and costs of econometric-system
forecasts compare with those of single-equation predictions? (e) With what
success for future prediction can technical adjustments be made on the basis
of the prediction record?
Some of these questions, such as (b) and (e), have already received partial
and tentative answers in [9] and in section 3 of this report, but the analysis
needs to be extended to materials for other model and nonmodel forecasts
and to the remaining and related questions. The most basic and penetrating
ones among the latter deal with misspecification errors in the models covered:
(f) Where do the most serious errors of this kind originate in each of the
49See references to [9] and to related ongoing research mentioned in earlier parts of
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models? (g)Howdo they affect the forecasting qualities of the models? (h)
What changes in the models would be likely to reduce such errors and
improve the forecasts? (i) What are the properties of a sound short-term
predictive model——do they differ from those of a good structural model and,
if so, how?
Even a very comprehensive evaluation of the forecasting aspects of the
models will not be sufficient to settle questions of this type, but some
contributions to the answers should be forthcoming from this work when
combined with the simulation analyses that are discussed below. However, a
more effective treatment of misspecification problems presumably requires a
thorough review of a model, by individual structural equations and by blocks
of closelyrelated equations fora given economic sector or process.
Re-estimation of a given block, with the variables in other blocks being taken
as exogenous, would be desirable, so as to detect those results that are in
conflict with theoretical expectations (the latter refer generally to such
conditionalpredictions).Thisexaminationof blocksimulations and
predictions could at least help isolate those instances in which the signs of the
model-generated statistics appear objectionable; the theory has less to say
about the magnitudes of the various coefficients, multipliers, and elasticities
involved, but the procedure should be able to spotlight any estimates that are
grossly out of line. In this way, one might hope to trace the misspecifications
to the individual equations, which should then be revised; after which the
"corrected" model should be subjected to new exercises in simulation and
prediction designed to test its performance. There is a very wide range of
variation on this general theme, and a number of approaches appear
promising; e.g., separate estimates for periods of cyclical expansions and
contractions could be computed and examined in an effort to test the effects
of nonlinearitiesinthe models. The need forall such tests has been
emphasized, and there are some notable initiatives in this direction in recent
literature.5° However, these are limited critical articles by individuals, and
what is required here is clearly a comprehensive and systematic study by a
group of researchers.5'
50Two papers on the Brookings model should be noted in this context: Zvi Griliches,
"The Brookings Model Volume: A Review Article," Review of Economics and Statistics,
May 1968, pp. 215—234 (see also "Comment" on this article by Gary Fromm and
Lawrence R. Klein, ibid., pp. 235—240); and Robert J. Gordon, "The Brookings Model
in Action: A Review Article," Journal of Political Economy, May—June 1970, pp.
489—525.
S litwould of course be highly desirable for such a project to secure the cooperation
of the model builders, but the latter should preferably not be included in the research
group itself.234 The Business Cycle Today
4.4 Business Cycle Analysis of Econometric Model Simulations
Simulation studies of the quarterly U.S. models can help answer some of
the questions formulated above (a, c, e, f, g, h, and i) and others such as
these: (j) Do the models under review generate cyclical behavior as defined
and observed in the empirical business cycle studies, notably those of the
NBER? (k) If so, to what extent are such fluctuations in the estimated series
produced endogenously by the models, and tO what extent are they
attributable to external impulses? In the process, much can be learned from
the models about the qualities of the ex post or conditional predictions, e.g.,
about the sensitivity of the simulations to the initial conditions and the
length of the predictive span. Such findings are likely to lead to inferences
about thestructuralproperties of the models; thus, a tendency for
nonstochastic simulationstoproduce strongly damped fluctuationsin
projected GNP would suggest that the model in question is dynamically
stable. Last but not least, insofar as the models provide valid representations
of the economy, simulation studies hold out a promise of contributing to the
knowledge of business cycles "in the real world," the question here being, Do
the cycles consist mainly of endogenous or exogenous movements?
As an outgrowth of the 1969 Harvard conference and owing to the
cooperation of the builders of several models, there now exists a very large
volume of rich statistical materials bearing on these problems. A cyclical
analysis of some of these data was undertaken in [34]. This study was
seriously limited by the resources available, including time, but its results met
with considerable interest and a consensus that further work in this area was
definitely desirable.52
To produce anycyclical movements, the models examined so far
apparently require perturbations in either the exogenous variables or the
relationships with endogenous variables or both. In experimenting with
100-quarter stochastic simulations that start at very recent dates and extend
into the future, smooth trend projections for the exogenous variables were
used in [34], but the absence of shocks or fluctuations in these projections is
an unrealistic feature which could be at least partly responsible for the
weakness of the cyclical elements in the simulations analyzed. Further tests
are needed to determine whether this weakness can be remedied or reduced
by imposing more or less sporadic disturbances on the exogenous factors.
Only small samples of the stochastic simulations have as yet been studied
for most of the endogenous variables selected for this investigation. The
52This conclusion is based on the discussions at the Conference on Econometric
Models of Cyclical Behavior cosponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., November 14, 1969, and at
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analysis needs to be extended to larger samples and to models other than
those included in [34].
4.5Interactionof Economic Developments and Policy Changes
Another important use of simulation techniques is for the study of the
effects upon the economy of alternative changes in the exogenous policy
variables. All full-scale models have variables of this kind, which are specified
as being determined by the actions of fiscal or monetary authorities.
However, the choice of these policy factors varies between the different
models, and some factors, particularly in the monetary area, have only
recently begun to receive explicit attention; the resulting discrepancies impair
intermodel comparisons of policy sensitivity.
Moreover, there are feedback effects of developments in the economy
upon the policy variables, which are very much in need of being explored.
For example, Federal Reserve policy is not necessarily exogenous in the sense
that it cannot be explained by other parts of the system; that policy might be
assumed to respond to the behavior of prices or unemployment or the
balance of payments (or to all of these and to still other factors), and is
exogenous only in the sense that the monetary authorities are not constrained
to take specified actions because of competitive or other kinds of market
forces. A systematic relation capable of being described in the model could
exist between, say, the changes in national output and the price level and the
reaction of the monetary and fiscal authorities as reflected by movements in
the so-called exogenous policy variables.
In a paper prepared for this colloquium, Yoel Haitovsky and Neil Wallace
discuss the results of experimental work with stochastic simulations designed
to reveal the effects of such interactions. They impose upon a model some
alternative fixed "policy rules," which involve certain quantified monetary
and fiscal responses to changes in the unemployment rate and the implicit
price deflator for GNP. The model includes autoregressive equations for the
noninstrumental exogenous variables, and the parameters and additive
disturbances are chosen randomly for each run or from quarter to quarter.
The experience gained in this pilot study should prove highly valuable for
future research in this area, which would probably involve extensions of the
analysis to a variety of models, policy rules, and instruments.
4.6 Feedback Effects of Major Macroeconomic Forecasts
A closely related problem concerns the feedback effect attributable to
publication of the forecast. Certain influential forecasts may significantly
affect the behavior of economic agents; the resulting changes in the economy236 The Business Cycle Today
might in turn lead to revisions of the policies, which would alter the general
economic development, and so on.
Published official forecasts (such as those of the Council of Economic
Advisers in the Economic Report of the President) are of particular interest
here, since they may well carry special weight as expressions or instruments
of the government's economic policies. The accuracy of such forecasts should
be compared not only with the accuracy of reputable private forecasts but
also with that of government agency forecasts that are made ahead of the
event but are not published or released until some later time. Both the
relative accuracy of the official forecasts and their influence on private
forecasts and expectations are matters of very considerable interest. There is
also need to study government forecasts in the context of concurrent and
subsequent economic policies, so as to learn more about how these factors
interact.
In some countries (Holland, Sweden, France), highly authoritative and
influential forecasts, based to a substantial extent on econometric models, are
prepared by agencies of governments that assume very active roles in
macroeconomic planning and policies. (In the United States, there is much
less centralization in these affairs.) In such situations, publication of the
government forecast may be interpreted to mean that steps will be taken to
change policy variables in the event that private actions are inconsistent with
the forecast results. In effect, under some circumstances the forecast might be
more accurately described as a plan to be implemented. Private reactions are
likely to be different if the forecast is viewed as a plan that can influence
policies rather than if no such connection between prediction and the
policy-making power is perceived. For these reasons, the feedback effects of
forecasts would probably lend themselves best to study by means of selected
international comparisons of forecasts and policies.
Howeffectiveareforecastsininfluencingpoliciesandgeneral
expectations, and thereby their own accuracy? Are forecasts frequently and
significantly validated when the predicted developments appear desirable to
those whose decisions count and are they, analogously, invalidated when they
predict changes that are deemed undesirable? Of the interesting but limited
theoretical work on such problems, some is highly abstract and speculative,
and little is conclusive.53 Yet, with the presently available models and data,
53The main contributionsare:Emile Grunberg and Franco Modigliani, "The
Predictability of Social Events," Journal of Political Economy, December 1954, pp.
465—478; Murray Kemp, "Economic Forecasting When the Subject of the Forecast Is
Influenced by the Forecast," American Economic Review, June 1962, pp. 492-496; and
the Communications on the latter paper by A. C. Chiang, Grunberg and Modigliani, and
Kemp, American Economic Review, September 1963, pp. 730—740.Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 237
better results should be obtainable, and considerable interest apparently
exists in international comparisons of economic forecasts generally and in the
specific questions raised here.54
4.7 Other Proposals and Concluding Remarks
Other related projects in this general area of research are being planned at
the National Bureau, and some of them appear to be as important and as
promising as those discussed above; but this report is long already and must
be kept within reasonable bounds, so only brief references can be made to
these proposals. One of the potentially most useful undertakings, as far as
improvement of the short-term predictive accuracy of econometric models is
concerned, is to revise the models in the direction of making more and better
use of survey data on business and consumer anticipations, governmental
budget estimates, leading indicators, and other similarly forward-looking
information. Besides enhancing the forecasting ability of the models, this
work may also yield returns in increased understanding of the economic
processes involved and in the feedback on the surveys, which could suggest
ways of obtaining more useful expectational data.
Another newly opened field of study that deserves much attention would
combine estimation of monthly aggregative series, where only quarterly data
now exist, with construction and examination of a monthly econometric
forecasting model of the U.S. economy. The feasibility of constructing a
monthly recursive macromodel was recently tested by T. C. Liu, with
generallypositiveresults.5Monthlyseriesfor GNP anditsmajor
components can be estimated indirectly by the method of interpolation by
related series for which monthly observations are available, although much
remains to be done to establish how best to implement this approach. Once a
monthly model, similar in size, structure, and estimation procedure to an
existing quarterly model, is constructed, the relative predictive performance
of the two could be compared by means of an analysis of corresponding ex
post forecasts and simulations. The dynamic properties of the monthly model
could be examined by spectral analysis and by business cycle analysis of
model simulations. This research, too, could provide some insights into the
consequences of aggregating an econometric model over time. It would
54This opinion is based on exploratory discussions that the author had withseveral
prospective suppliers of statistical data and other information pertinent to such a study:
the directors or officers in charge of forecasting at the leading economic research
institutes and planning agencies in London, Stockholm, Paris, and the OECD.
55See Ta-Chung Liu, "A Monthly Recursive Econometric Model of UnitedStates: A
Test of Feasibility," Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1969,pp. 1—13.238 The Business Cycle Today
probably be sufficient to use small-scale models, at least in the pilot studies
contemplated here.
In the nature of things, plans for future research permit no conclusions, so
only a few general remarks are offered to conclude this report. The
investment in research resources embodied in the past and current National
Bureau studies on economic forecasting is believed to have paid off well in
the results which are partly and briefly summarized in sections 2 and 3 above;
but the verdict on this must be left to the reader and the user of these studies
and, ultimately, to those who will judge their influence on and usefulness for
future scientific inquiry. The last part of my paper will have accomplished
much of its purpose if it showed how much remains still to be done, while
also conveying the sense that ambitious efforts in this field are now both
needed and promising.
REFERENCES
1. Christ, Carl F. "A Test of an Econometric Model of the United States, 1921—1947."
In [26,pp. 35—107].
2. ———."AggregativeEconometric Models: A Review Article," American Economic
Review, June 1956, pp. 385 —408.
3. Cole, Rosanne. "Data Errors and Forecasting Accuracy." In [15, pp. 47—821.
4. ——— . Errorsin Provisional Estimates of Gross National Product. New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1969.
5.Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. Short-term Economic Forecasting.
Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 17. Princeton University Press for NBER,
1955.
6. Cox, Garfield V. An Appraisal of American Business Forecasts. Rev. ed. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1930.
7. Curinyngham, Jon. "Econometric Model Forecasts." Forty-fifth Annual Report of
the National Bureau of Economic Research. New York, June 1965, pp.
60—64.
8. Duller, Stanley. "Expectations in the Term Structure of Interest Rates." In [15, pp.
112—1161.
9. Evans, Michael K.; Haitovsky, Yoel; and Treyz, George I.; assisted by Vincent Su.
"An Analysis of the Forecasting Properties of U.S. Econometric Models," In
Econometric Models of Cyclical Behavior. Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol.
36, New York, NBER, 1972.
10. Evans, Michael K., and Klein, Lawrence R. The Wharton Econometric Model.
Studies in Quantitative Economics No. 2. Philadelphia, Economics Research
Unit, University of Pennsylvania, 1967.
11. Fels, Rendigs, and Hinshaw, C. Elton. Forecasting and Recognizing Business Cycle
Turning Points. New York, NBER, 1968.
12. Green, George R., in association with Maurice Liebenberg, and Albert A. Hirsch.
"Short- and Long-Term Simulations with the OBE Econometric Model." In
Econometric Models, (see [9]).
13. Juster,F. Thomas. "Consumer Anticipations and Models of Durable Goods
Demand." In [15, pp. 167—242].Forecasting Economic Conditions: Record and Prospect 239
REFERENCES (continued)
14. Liebenberg,Maurice;Hirsch,AlbertA.;andPopkin,Joel."A Quarterly
Econometric Model of the United States: A Progress Report." Survey of
Current Business, May 1966, pp. 13—39.
15. Mincer, Jacob, ed. Economic Forecasts and Expectations: Analyses of Forecasting
Behavior and Performance. New York, NBER, 1969.
16. Mincer, Jacob, and Zarnowitz, Victor. "The Evaluation of Economic Forecasts." In
[15, pp. 3—46].
17. Mincer, Jacob. "Models of Adaptive Forecasting." In [15, pp. 83—111].
18. Moore, Geoffrey H., and Shiskin, Julius. Indicators of Business Expansions and
Contractions. New York, NBER, 1967.
19. ."ForecastingShort-Term Economic Change," Journal of the American
Statist/ca/Association, March 1969, pp. 1—22.
20. Okun, Arthur M. "A Review of Some Economic Forecasts for 1955—1957." Journal
of Business, July 1959, pp. 199—211.
21. ———."Onthe Appraisal of Cyclical Turning-point Predictions." Journal of
Business,April1960, pp. 10 1—120.
22. Rasche, Robert H., and Shapiro, Harold T. "The FRB-MIT Econometric Model: Its
Special Features." American Economic Review, May 1968, pp. 123—149.
23. Stekler, Herman 0. Economic Forecasting. New York; Praeger, 1970.
24. Suits, Daniel B. "Forecasting and Analysis with an Econometric Model." American
Economic Review, March 1962, pp. 104—132.
25. Theil, Henri. Economic Forecasts and Policy. 2nd ed. Amsterdam, North-Holland,
1961.
26. ——--. AppliedEconomic Forecasting. C'hicago, Rand-McNally, 1966.
27. Universities—National Bureau Committee for Economic Research. Conference on
Business Cycles. New York, NBER, 1951.
28. .TheQuality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data. Princeton
University Press for NBER, 1960.
29. Zarnowitz, Victor. An Appraisal of Short-TermEconomic Forecasts. New York,
NBER, 1967.
30. ———. "EineAuswertung von Kurzfristigen Wirtschaftsvoraussagen in den USA."
IFO-Studien, 1966, pp. 1—41.
31. ———. "AnEvaluation of Price-Level Forecasts." 1968 Proceedings of the Business
andEconomicStatisticsSection.AmericanStatisticalAssociation.
Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 284—289.
32. ——.—. "TheNew ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians." The
American Statistician, Februrary 1969, pp. 12—16.
33. ———."TheASA-NBER Quarterly Survey of the Economic Outlook: An Early
Appraisal."l 969 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section.
American Statistical Association. Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 24 1—249.
34. Zarnowitz, Victor; Boschan, Charlotte; and Moore, Geoffrey H.; with the assistance
ofJosephineSu."Business-CycleAnalysisofEconometricModel
Simulations." In Econometric Models (see [9]).